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ABSTRACT
To be acceptable to the coal industry, an advanced extraction system
must provide a significant improvement over conventional systems in cost,
safety, environmental impact, and conservation of unmined coal. Qualitative
and quantitative evaluation methodologies were developed to assist the designer
in determining if a proposed extraction design will be safer than existing
systems. The qualitative analysis is a process which tests the new system
against regulations and hazards of existing similar systems. The analysis
examines the soundness of the design, whether or net the major hazards have
been eliminated or reduced, and how the reduction would be accomplished. The
quantitative methodology prov ides the designer with a means of establishing
the approximate impact of hazards on injury levels. The results are further
weighted by peculiar geological elements, specialized safety training, peculiar
mine environmental aspects, and reductions in labor force. The outcome is
compared with injury level requirements based on similar, safer industries to
get a measure of the new system's success in reducing injuries. This approach
provides a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of hazards and their
effects than existing safety analyses.
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FOREWORD
This document is one of a series which describes the methodology for
evaluating advanced underground coal mining equipment. This methodology is
summarized in "Overall Requirements for an Advanced Underground Coal
Extraction System," JPL Publication 80-39 by Martin Goldsmith and Milton L.
Lavin. Five areas of performance are discussed:
(1) Production cost.
(2) Miner safety.
(3) Miner health.
(4) Environmental impact.
(5) Recovery efficiency.
The report presents the detailed safety methodology used to evaluate
advanced designs.
This work is part of an effort to define and develop innovative coal
extraction systems suitable for the significant resoures remaining in the
year 2000. Sponsorship is provided by the Office of Mining, United States
Department of Energy, via an interagency agreement with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. William B. Schmidt, Director of the
Office of Mining, is the project officer.
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DEFINITION OF SYMBOLS
B j
	The historical aggregate number of yearly body injuries for a given
accident class j, associated with a conventional design used as a
comparison against a protective feature of a new design.
bj	 The Aggregate projected yearly body injuries in a given accident
class j, for a new design.
da	 The fractional, adjustment in injuries of a given accident class it
based on the consensus of a group of experts pertaining to a new
protective device.
fi
	
	
The fractional change in the labor force for a given task; between a
new design and an analogous conventional comparison.
gi
	
The fractional adjustment in injuries for a given task i t bused on
the consensus of a group of experts pertaining to a new design.
Ni	 The historical, yearly injuries associated with a given task $ of an
analogous conventional system used as a comparison against a new
design.
ni	 The projected yearly injuries for a given task i of a new design.
1	
-	
,
Ri	 The ratio of serious injuries to all injuries for a given task it
for a conventional system used as a comparison against a new design. i
Si	 The projected number of yearly serious injuries for a given task it
of a new design.
ti	 The time (hours) exposed to a given hazard for a task i t as
performed in a new design.	 i
1
Ti	 The time (hours) exposed to a given hazard for a task i t as
performed in a conventional system used as a comparison against a
new design.	 1
I
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
A.	 08JECTIVES
Coal mining has experienced rates of temporary and permanently disabling
injuries and fatalities two to three times greater than other occupations.
Table 1-1 presents a summary of injury statistics compiles by the M*ning Safety
and Health Administration (MSNA) and the U. S. Department of Labor iar the
period 1972 through 1978, for underground coal mining and four similar
industries.
The growiazg need to supplement diminishing oil reserves has suggested a
greater commitment to the use of coal, and a requirement for increased coal
production through the development of advanced coal extraction systems. To
meet this commitment, advanced systems should provide a cumber of improvements
over existing systems. Among the desired improvements is a reduction In
underground coal mining disabling injuries and fatalities from those shown in
Table 1-1. One of the primary objectives of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) Advanced Coal Extraction Systems Definition Project is the reduction of
miner injuries and fatalities to Levels comparable to other heavy industries
`	 Table 1-1.	 Aver gr: rajury Rates in Selected Industries
for the 'eariod 1972 Through 1978
Disabling
Aggregate Injuries Fatalities Injuries
Industry Per Million Per Million Per Million
Man-Hours Man-Hours Main-Hours
r	 Underground
Coal Mining 105.3 0.4 58.2
(for Central
Appalachia)
Conbtruction 84.6 0.2 29.2
Primary Metals 90.5 - 32.0
Non-Metal/
Metal Mining 30.7 - 37.7 0.3 18.0 - 23.3
Petroleum 53.4 0.3 28.5
r	Sources:	 MSHA Injury Statistics (1971-1979) Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) Injury Statistics (1972-1978)
1-1
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such as the ones shown in Table 1-1. This requirement was published as part
of Goldsmith's and Lavin's Overall Requirements for an Advanced Underground
Goal Extraction S.atem (19 Q(1).
The purpose of this sx^ x;ty evaluation methodology is to provide a pro-
cedure which can be used to determine if proposed new mining systems will
satisfy the safety requirements. The procedure compares proposed advanced
systems with conventional equipment, and with other industries, to assess the
likelihood of reducing minor disabling injury and fatality rates by 50%.
B.	 SAFETY REQUIREMENT SUMMARY
The ,safety requirements, published in the Overall Requirementsdocument,
were formulated so that advanced underground coal mining would match tlae safety
performance of comparnbl.e industries, and so that the hazards contributing the
largest number of fatalities and disabling injuries would be reduced. The
concept of injury frequency was approached using the four industries listed in
Table 1--1 0 because of their similarity to coal mining in terms of both the
types of hazards encountered and the severity of accidents which occur. Al-
though the aggregate injury rate for coal mining is already within the range
of two of the four industries, the fatality and disabling injury rates for
coal mining are approximately two times higher than the four similar. industries.
It was concluded that the safety requirement should stimulate a reduction in
donths and disabling injuries. Also, the requirement should be stated in a
'way co allow for chaznger, in the injury and fatality rate-4 	 both coal. mining
and the comparable industries during the ten- to twenty--year period required
for the development of new technology. These conclusions resulted in the
following statement of the requirement-
AT THE ANTICIPATED TIME OF FIRST COMMERCIAL USh, ANY ADVANCED
UNDERGROUND COAL MINING SYSTEM MUST HAVE RATES FOR FATALITIES,
DISABLING INJURIES, AND TO'T'AL INJURIES WHICH FALL WITHIN THE
RANGES OF RATES EXPERIENCED BY INDUSTRIES WHICH ARE JUDGED TO
H AVE COMPARABLE HAZARDS.
The requirement requires a projection into the future of all three
categories of injuries; however, examination of the fatality and disabling
injury rates revealed no particular trend for coal manl.ng or for any one of
the comparison industries. Therefore, the fatality and disabling injury
requirement was projected by extrapolating the industry experience of the
seven-year period, 1972 through 1978. The total injuries were projected using
the industry experience and by assuming that the ratio of severe and disabling
injuries to total injuries would remain constant based on the most recent
eights-year injury history from MSNA. This yielded the following target rates:
(1) Total injuries:	 40-45 /million man-hours
(2) Disabling injuries:	 30/million man-hours
(3) Fatalities:	 0.2/million man-hours
These targets are based upon projections which may prove to be pessimistic as
technology evolves.
,r
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Both frequency and severity were also addressed by identifying which
hazards contribute most to serious injuries. Examination of fatality and
disabling injury rates for Central Appalachia (currently the major source of
underground production) indicated a consistently high contribution from roof
and face fallsp haulage accidents (wordy in the form of pinch and aqueese
injuries), other machinery-related accidenta, and injuries sustained while
handling material. Table 1-2 indicates that these four hasards have continu-
s ly accounted for more than 75% of all serious injuries during the period
1972 through 1978.
The safety methodology for evaluating new , concepts was established after
the performance goals were determined. The following sections summarize the
current studies used to develop the foundation for the safety wathodology t and
also provide a description of the methodology. Flow diagrams are provided to
show how the MSHA injury data and other pertinent information are used to
assess new concepts and determine whether they meet the prescribed safety
requirements.
C.	 CURRENT PRACTICE AS RELATED TO THE SAFETY METHODOLOGY
The framework of the methodology fo evaluating advanced coal extraction
systems against the requirements was developed around the existing MSHR injury
reporting format, using recent studies pertinent to the evaluation of system
safety. The MSHA injury reporting format most useful for this study weal the.
tabulation of fatalities, disabling and nondisabling injuries as a function of
Table 1-2. Average Percent Contribution to Serious Injuries
from the Major Accident Causal. Categories
Avg % Contribution to
Accident Causal Category	 Fatalities W and
Disabling Injuries (DI)
	
F	 • DI
Roof/Face/Rib Falls
	 47	 15
Haulage	 23	 16
Machinery	 14	 15
Handling 'Material 	 0	 32
*Subtotal
	
84	 78
*NOTE: This list does not include remaining accident classes which crake up
the total injuries.
Source - MSHA Injury Statistics (1972-1978)
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major accident cause (such as machinery or electrical), and the activity at
the time of the accident. This information formed the data base for the
detailed comparison between new and conventional systems.
The safety methodology examines new designs through two stages of
development: the "conceptual design" and "preliminary design." In organizing
the methodology, it became clear that at a conceptual stage, where only the
basic architecture is known, it sufficed to identify new system hazards and
potential advantages of the new design (qualitative analysis). Several ideas
from the system safety literature were drawn upon to design this part of the
evaluation. One hazard evaluation techi;ique is "fault tree analysis," which
links together events, or combinations of events, that must occur to result in
a hazardous condition. This is a powerful tool for identifying hazards and-
determining their impact. Chugh, et al., used the technique in their paper,
"Metallic and Nonmecallie Mining in the United States - A Hazard Analysis"
(1974)(2). The fault-tree analysis is also useful for evaluating hazard and
task relationships. In "Risk Assessment Methodologies; An Application to
Underground Mine Systems" (1978) 9 Denny, et al., used fault-tree analysis to
examine cause and effects in the 1972 Sunshine Mine fire disaster (3).
Since the conceptual design stage contains little detailed information
on worker interaction with particularly hazardous events or components, it is
more useful to identify general worker-subsystem relationships that have his-
torically resulted in many injuries. A checklist showing these generally known
relationships allows an easy examination of new designs to assess their basic
merits. There are many kinds of checklists for displaying the main hazard-
event or hazard-subs ystem relationships. "Layered" or "cross-tabulation"
accident-injury structures provide cause and effect information for hazard
assessment. The advantage of this approach is that an evaluator can easily go
from a particular hazard to a characteristic injury and accident situation, or
vice versa. Such an approach is discussed by Blumenthal in "An Alternative
Approach to Measurement of Industrial Safety Performance Based on Structural
Conception of Accident Causation" (1970)(4); and by Ramsey in "Identification
of Contributory Factors in Occup4tional Injury" (1973)(5).
The more detailed cause and effect type information which can be devel-
oped during preliminary design allows better definition of how and to what
degree workers are exposed to hazards (quantitative analysis), Workers experi-
ence exposure to hazards by the nature of the tasks they perform, their prox-
imity to sources of hazards (such as unsupported roof or operating machinery),
the amount of time spent doing tasks, and the amount of protection afforded.
This type of information provides the basis for making projections about new
system safety performance as compared to the safety of existing systems.
One way of handling the concept of "exposure" and its relationship to
the adverse effects of various hazards has been to develop "exposure indices."
For example, in 'Development of Health and Safety Indices for the Evaluation
of Underground Coal Mining systems" (1973), Pfleider and Krug developed sub-
jective hazard indices for` noise and dust (6). Indices reflecting hazard
severity were based principally upon the amount of time a worker is exposed,
and the noise or dust rating (for a given machine or work area) in accordance
with OSHA and MSHA standards. Frantz and King used the concept of exposure-
indices to project the safety impacts from remotely operated continuous miners
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in their paper, "A Study of Human Factors Aspects of an Automated Continuous
Mining Section" (1977) (7). These indices, based on the percent change in
number of workers, or worker man-hours, were used to measure the reduction in
exposure to various hazards, In addition, there have been several industrial
engineering studies of the specific mining tasks (and task times) that expose
workers to hazardous situations. A good example, of this work is the study done
by Theodore Barry and Associates in "Operating ' practice Changes and Control
Modifications to Improve the Safety of Coal Augering Operations" (1975) (8).
The references cited above, as well as many others (9,10), represent
well conceived approaches to assessing hazards, defining exposure, and identi-
fying ways of reducing risk. The concepts developed in this }gaper draw on
these approaches and suggest some refinements that may provide a more compre-
hensive, quantifiable assessment of hazards.
D.	 SUMMARY OF SAFETY EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
The strength of this methodology stems mainly from (1) a complete
analysis of potentially hazardous system failures, (2) an analysis of the
human interfaces with hazardous system and geological failures, (3) consid-
eration of the variation in exposure to hazards during the performance of
various tasks, and (4) consideration of ways to reduce both exposure and
hazard severity so as to bring injuries down to a level commensurate with the
requirements.
Since advanced systems may not resemble existing architectures at all,
it is extremely important to examine each design by itself to understand hov
workers are exposed to both existing and new hazards. The following general
steps indicate the normal process for evaluating system safety:
(1) Assess areas of potential hazard.
(2) Identify areas of adverse effect.
(3) Relate exposure with effect..
(4) Estimate the safety impacts.
(5) Determine whether the impact is sizeable.
The methodology presented here follows this basic process, and also accounts
for the uncertainty involved with completely new architectures. For example,
in order to assess areas of potential hazards, the system and environment are
broken down into their respective components. Each component is examined by
itself, and as it interacts with other components, with the purpose of under-
standing how they may fail and cause a hazardous situation. This is important
because new systems may introduce new hazards which cannot be assessed until
the detailed failure modes are understood. The identification of possible
adverse effects follows directly from understanding how workers interact with
system failures. Human factors analysis, which examines the interface prob-
lems between users and hardware, provides the basis for understandingthese
r
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interactions. The results of both of these steps then provide the potential
hazards that could be present and comprise the actual hazard analysis.
At the conceptual design stage, the basic architecture is known, along
with some additional information on how the system will operate, and in partic-
ular, the structure of essential worker tasks. If there are several new
systems to be evaluated, it is important to choose the. most promising systems
before further development costs are incurred. This can be done by performing
a system hazard analysis, as described above, and then comparing the new
systems against similar, existing systems to identify improvements. This
methodology can be used to perform this initial elimination process before
performing a more detailed analysis on those designs considered most promising.
This initial analysis is also important because it directs the evaluator toward
the strong areas of the design that should be evaluated more closely later on.
A flow chart of the conceptual stage analysis is presented in Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1 shows that the actual system comparison process requires both
an examination of general conformance with safety regulations and hazards.
From the hazard analysis, it is relatively char as to how the system will
interact with workers. Using a similar, existing system as a basis of com-
parison, the new system is tested to see if it meets the intent of the safety
regulations designed to protect workers. If it does, then the system is
examined to determine what hazards are potentially removed or added as com-
pared to existing systems. Finally, the results of the system failure and
human factor analyses are used to determine where the new system streamlines
equipment or operations so as to reduce exposure time, or if it provides more
worker protection. If a new system potentially offers either of these advan-
tages, then it is considered promising and worth investigating further.
The next stage in the methodology is to gather preliminary design data
and examine new designs more closely. These data include task times and
descriptions, production rates, crew sizes, protective devices, and machinery
redesign possibilities. The same data pertaining to task times, production
rates, crew size, etc., are collected for the contemporary equipment selected
for comparison. Also tabulated are historical injury experiences related to
the major hazards associated with the various conventional tasks. As shown in
Figure 1-2, the analysis process at the preliminary design stage is more
detailed than the conceptual stage evaluation.
The two systems are compared from the standpoint of hazards, fractional
reduction (or increase) in exposure times, number of people exposed, and body
protection afforded. For each task, man-hours at risk are multiplied by the
injury rates observed for similar equipment, and then total system safety
performance is estimated by aggregating rates for various tasks and hazards.
This projection of injuries per million man-hours of exposure represents a
logically structured estimate of whether or not the new system can meet the
stated system safety requirements; therefore, it provides a relative measure
of the potential safety impact of using this new technology. Expert judgment
is included to understand the potential risk more clearly by considering that
the degree of exposure to hazards and the resultant injuries are not neces-
sarily directly proportional, and that some hazards interact with each other
to increase exposure. A group of experts familiar with coal mining safety are
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given both the historical and initial estimate of the injury rates expected
for the new system by considering (1) the new system design, (2) a hazard
comparison between the two systems, and (3) present injury levels. The experts
are then asked to modify the original estimates until a final range of injuries
is reached. if more detailed design data are available on site conditions
which may aggravate hazards (e.g., there are more slips and falls in a wet mtoe
environment than a dry environment), then the experts are asked to also con-
sider this information in the injury forecast. The final consensus on expected
system performance is compared against the requirement to measure compliance..
In conclusion, the methodology presented in this paper contributes
several refinements to existing safety analyses: (1) advanced systems, which
may be completely different from existing systems, are examined on their own
merits and shortcomings, with special attention given to hazards unique to the
new equipment; (2) systems are broken down into the detailed components and
associated worker interfaces to understand the exposure to various hazards
(e.g, assuming that injuries would be alleviated for a given hazard by pro-
viding protection for a task area that only contributes a small fraction to the
actual injuries would result in an incorrect conclusion about system safety);
(3) both aspects of injury frequency and severity are consideted through the
u ge of exposure time and body protection parameters; (4) the /Analysis provides
a means of identifying weak design areas by indicating where exposure time is
increased or where protection is ineffectual; and (5) practical guidelines in
the form of requirements based on safety experience in similar industries are
provided for measuring safety improvements.
The structure of this document is such that the hazard analysis, which
forms the foundation of the safety methodology ? is developed first and is dis-
cussed in Section II. The safety regulations are also important to the devel-
opment of safe advanced coal extraction systems and are summarized in Section
III so the reader has an understanding of the overall intent of the regulations
and how they should be used in evaluating designs. The safety methodology to
be used for the conceptual design stage safety evaluation is described in
Section IV. A step-by-step procedure is presented in Section IV which qualita-
tively evaluates whether a new conceptual design improves safety by a sufficient
margin as to warrant further development of the design. The safety methodology
for the preliminary design stage evaluation is described in Section V. This
section presents a procedure, and supporting examples, that can be used to
quantitatively determine whether an advanced coal extraction system has the
potential for meeting the improved safety requirements stipulated for new coal
mining systems. Exposure time data for conventional mining equipment are pro-
vided in the Appendix as a convenience for the evaluator it, comparing the time
workers are exposed to hazards for both the advanced system and conventional
equipment.
A.
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SECTION 11
HAZARD ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW OF THE HAZARD ANALYSIS
The key purpose of any safety evaluation is to understand what hazards
might be present in a particular design, and what the sources of those hazards
are. The approach taken in this paper is to (1) understand failure mechanisms
of the system which can prevent the system from operating as it should (e.g.,
component failure due to age or improper design, geological failures which are
natural occurrences but may still damage equipment), and human error which
often contributes to component failures; (2) examine whether or not workers
are interacting with the system at the time of failure, since the consequences
of these failures may be of such magnitude aR to injure workers; and (3) use
the historical evidence present in the form of fault tree analysis and injury
statistics to understand what kinds of interactions result in hazardous situa-
tions and injuries. A comprehensive list of hazards and an indication of the
more hazardous situations surrounding existing equipment are provided as a
general guide to hazard identification. An important objective of the analysis
is the discovery of new hazards by examining all unique elements of a design
and how they may impact workers in such a way as to cause a hazardous situation.
Some brief examples are provided to clarify the nature of a hazard analysis.
B. ELEMENTS OF THE HAZARD ANALYSIS
1.	 System Failure Analysis
There are many ways 1Pn which a mining system may suffer major
breakdowns which can expose work ers to hazardous situations. By definition,
the mining system includes all equipment used, the environment in which the
equipment operates, and the labor force. In the process of mining, the
machinery is stressed while cutting coal and rock or transporting heavy
loads. The geologic environment is stressed by removing coal and rock and
leaving semi-supported cavities. The labor force is stressed by having to
deal with the uncertainty of both machinery and environmental variables,
confounded by a working area that is poorly lit and often wet. Studying how
all these elements of the mining system break down provides the first clue to
understanding how hazardous situations arise.
a.	 Machinery Failures. Machine components fail by three basic
mechanisms. The first is age-reliability degradation. Components subjected
to thermal cycles ( such as motors), cyclic loading (bearings or booms), or
constant abrasion (bearings and. cutters) are examples of this failure mode..
The second is improper design. This essentially means that a component .fails
because the actual loads it experiences exceed the loads it was designed to
withstand. In the third mechanism an undamped input forces the component to
its failure threshold ( such as the inrush current to electrical switches and
motors causing burnout), or the component responds in an undamped manner which
causes it to become uncontrollable and impact another component or object`.
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When analyzing potential machine failures the system is first separated
into its major components (cutter components, booms, pumps and hydraulic
lines, motors, brake systems, gearboxes, electric cables, etc.). The next
step is to systematically identify all the different conditions under which
each component can fail. This includes second order interactions such as
components interacting with each other (i.e., a cutter breaking and severing
adjacent hydraulic lines). The data from these analyses are then system-
atically classified.
b.	 Failures of the Geologic Environment Around Equipment. This
is important to define because, in a sense, the environment is not actually
failing. As the coal and rock are extracted, roof and rib loads are redistrib-
uted toward an equilibrium. Under svate conditions, caving is the means by
which that equilibrium is achieved. Though this is a perfectly normal process
and not a failure in the true sense of the word, the strata would not cave if
the seam was not extracted. Therefore this paper considers the extraction
process as a means through which the strata is induced to fail under abnormal
conditic,!4s (i.e., unsupported roof). A similar definition applies to the
release of gas into the working area. Though the gas would normally be con-
tained, the extraction process induces ti,e strata to release gas which can
ignite and cause both caving as well as eq^Apment damage.
When evaluating new systems operating in ui:derground environments, these
failures should be recognized as everpresent problems which can also cause
major breakdowns.
C.	 Human Error. Human error is often reported as carelessness.
However, the mine environment in which workers operate machinery and perform
support tasks is far from ideal.. For example, vision can be obscured by large
machinery, operating in close quarters, under poor lighting conditions. This
is aggravated by having to perform tasks in a constrained, wet environment,
which contributes to unstable ground conditions and fatigue. The degree to
which workers are trained to perform support tasks also contributes to their
ability to deal with these conditions and avoid making mistakes. Insufficient
training can r <^ sult in improper use of equipment or workers not recognizing
hazardous situations.
When evaluating new systems it is important to understand that all of
the above factors affect the way workers can make mistakes. Human error can
be categorized into three broad areas (11,12,13);
(1) Workers are inexperienced mind/are not sufficiently trairied to
recognize hazardous situations.
(2) Workers recognize hazardous situations but still choose to accept
the risk of exposing themselves, and possibly others, to injury.
(3) Worker's perception and reaction to hazards are dulled by fatigue.
In designing new systems, the effort toward eliminating human failures
should be directed toward removing the requirement for the human to decide
whether a situation Ji,s hazardous or not, or designing the system to prevent a
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worker from risking the safety of others (e.g., prevent careless equipment
operation by using component stress sensors and controls, obstacle sensors,
speed controls, etc.).
2. Human Involvement with System Failures
The most important component of any hazard analysis is determining
whether a worker is directly involved in the system failure (14). This part
of the analysis requires a basic understanding of what kinds of tasks workers
will be required to perform when operating a new system. This information
would have to be mailable at the conceptual design stage and would include
(1) knowing how much and what kind of equipment will be required, (2) how many
people will be required to operate the equipment, and (3) where workers will
be stationed during the operation and maintenance of the equipment. All of
these information elements will be explained in greater detail 'later in the
methodology. Next, the evaluator systematically examines the interaction of
major potential failures with workers. In some cases a system component may
fail catastrophically but not 'interact with workers (e.g., an internal gear
box failure, or failure of a remotely controlled component). In these cases
the failure is considered benign because a hazard is not presumed to exist
unless a worker is present. This does not mean that workers are totally safe
from these kinds of failures. Even though a component has already failed,
workers may still be exposed to after effects such as, (1) latent failures of
other components during maintenance (i.e., hydraulic lines), (2) environmental
and human errors associated with doing maintenanee on a unit located in a
poorly illuminated and cramped workspace, or (3) manual replacement of heavy,
cumbersome machine components. It is important to evaluate each major system
failure and worker interaction. through both the operational and maintenance
phases of operation. This total list of major failures and possible human
interactions, coupled with existing accident and injury experience leads to the
identification of hazardous situations.
3. Hazard Identification
Matching each major system failure with its respective interaction
with workers provides both the hazard and major potential accident causal.
factors (e.g., roof falls, machinery, handling material). This procedure can
be made clearer by considering the extensive historical data available on
accidents and injuries. The detailed accident and injury causes from MSHA
combined with the results of fault tree analysis reveals the various hazards
and resultant injuries for existing equipment, and provides insight it:to system
failures, human interactions, and the overall process of hazard identification
(2,3,12,15). The major accident causes generally recognized by MSHA are roof/
rib and face falls, slips and falls, handling material, tools, pinches and
squeezes associated with haulage, electricity, machinery, explosions due to
gas, oust or explosives, and suffocation. These causes can further be broken
down by fault tree analysis into the following list of contributing hazards:
(1)
	 Roof/Rib/Face Fall.
Support is adequate t
 but is disturbed or insufficient due tot
(a) Being struck by a vehicle.
a	 Vehicle out of control, due to mechanical failure
(brakes, steering, etc.).
•	 Vehicle out of control due to an operator
failure (carelessness, poor training, bad
environment such as wetness, poor visibility or
traffic congestion).
(b) Being struck by a tool in the hands of a worker.
(c) Being struck by material being handled by workers.
(d) Being improperly placed or set, and works loose or
does not provide support in the right locations.
(e) Support is inadequate for protection because:
•	 Unusual geologic conditions are encountered
(s /ges/water pockets under high pressure).
•	 Insufficient data are available on roof and rib
conditions, causing insufficient placement of
reinforcements.
•	 openings and entries are improperly designed or
improperly executed in accordance with the
design.
•	 Workers are careless, lack; experience or are
improperly trained on how and where to set
reinforcements.
(f) protection provided workers is adequate, buts
•	 Workers are pe nnitted to work outside protection
during performance of tasks, or have to move
from underneath protection in order to see.
•	 Workers are not trained properly or are careless
and do not observe when they are outside of the
protection.
•	 Unusual geologic condition encountered (e.g.,
rock blast).
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(g)
	
Protection is inadequal ,,e
 as a result of:
•	 Protection not being designed to withstand the
force of rock falls, or prevent debris intrusion
into the operating or working area.
(2)	 Slit, and pall
(a) Wormer in a position to be caught off balance due tot
•	 Tool or object being worked on breaking.
•	 Worker not property trained or careless,
choosing to use toot not suited for task
resulting in it breaking or slipping.
•	 Workers escaping another hazard such as an
explosion or out of control vehicle.
•	 Workers being on loose or slippery footing and,
or t handling cumbersome material in a bad
environment (such as low coal).
•	 Improper pincement/lack of adequate guards on
machines ur elevated structures to prevent falls.
•	 Guards or equipment fai.l.ing when stressed in
normal, working conditions (i.e., defective
scaffolding, railings, ladders, etc.).
•	 Workers being careless on machines or elevated
structures.
(b) Worker in a position to be struckt
•	 By tool or material being handled by another
worker.
•	 By machinery.
•	 By sliding material such as loose rock or mud.
(c) Worker receives air, electrical shock.
(3) Handling Material
(a) Worker in a position to be struck ty material as a
result of
•	 Materials being stored in an unstable position
and falling.
r
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•	 Materials being defective and failing (breaking)
when being handled (e.g., props, machine parts).
•	 Other workers not handling material properly or
being improperly trained.
•
	
	
Handling a heavy machine component while
replacing it.
(a) Physical capabilities exceeded as a result of:
•	 material weight too heavy for worker.
•	 Material size too cumbersome for worker to
C	 handle comfortably.
i
i
(G) Tool Injury
(a) Worker in a position to strike or be struck by a tool
as a result of
•	 'Cool being defective and slipping or breaking.
•	 Object being worked on has difficult
configuration or is defective, causing tool to
slip, jam or break (i.e., crowbars/bars, picks,
axes, sledge hamsters, shovels).
•	 Handling tool carelessly # causing it to slip or
break.
•	 Being close to coworkers using tools.
•	 Dropping tool on self, or having tool dropped.
from above.
(b) Worker in a position to be struck by objects being
worked on by tools as related;; to:
Flying particles from objects worked on (e.g.,
object f`ragse!nto such as rock chips).
(5) Pinch or Squeeze as Typically Related to Haulage Type
Activities
(a) Worker in a position to be struck by machine due to
vehicle going out of control:
•	 Mechanical malfunction.
si	 Poor environment obstructing vision or causing
skidding.
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•	 Striking an object (e.g., rock, building
material).
•	 Operator carelessness.
(b) Worker in-between objects which can move:
•	 poor lighting and blind corners causing vehicles
to collide, or causing vehicle to impact rib.
•	 Worker punched In cab following collision of two
vehicles.
• Machine or system design requires worker to be
in a cramped area between an operating vehicle
and rib due to poor layout of maintenance areas.
•	 Exposed to being struck or to pinch points on
moving or rotating machinery (e.g. t conveyors)
Poor layout of maintenance and operating
areas around machinery.
Bad lighting.
Carelessness.
(6)	 Electrical Shock/Burns
(a) Worker in a position to be in contact with a conductor
as a result of:
•	 Tool or machine coming in contact with a bare
energized conductor (e.g, frayed cable) causing
shock or arc.
•	 Worker forced to handle energized electrical
components or do electrical maintenance (cable
splicing/handlings switch/junction box checks,
etc.) in a damp or wet environment.
(Z)	 Machinery
(a) Worker is struck by machine as result of:
•	 Tramming and moving machinery in close quarters.
•	 Bad lighting or obscured vision which prevents
operator detecting other workers in area.
^	
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•	 insufficient guards.
•	 Machine components breaking due to:
Normal material fatigue.
Being operated past stress limits
(carelessness, improper training).
'-	 Being improperly designed,
•	 Noise obscuring presence of other machinery.
(b) Worker in a position to be caught in machinery due to:
•	 wearing loose clothing which gets ingested.
(	 Carelessness.
m	 Insufficient lighting to avoid contact with
catch points.
(S) Explosion/Burns
(a) Workers in area of methane release and:
•	 Poor ventilation causes gas buildup at face
where mining operations generate sparks (e.g.,
striking rock with cutter picks).
9	 Inadequate monitoring of gas allows gas buildup
and ignition (worker carelessness or equipment
failure).
•	 Ignition source present due to short on
equipment or power source.
(b) Workers are working 1 th, or in proximity to,
explosives and:
•	 Explosive materials are improperly handled,
causing detonation.
•	 Explosive materials detonate prematurely due to
effect of age on material instability, or
improper design of detonating. devi=e (detonation
by outside electrical noise).
o Explosives detonated and workers are in line of
blast or given insufficient warning, or workers
are exposed to the shock wave generated by the
"	 blast.
s
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(9) High Pressure Release
(a) Workers exposed ►o high pressure release due to
natural geologic occurrences such as:
• Intersecting a pocket of air, gas or water under
pressure (i.e., natural gas well, artesian well,
underground spring) and system does not provide
adequate warning.
b) Workers exposed to high pressure releases from
machinery such as:
•	 Impact by high pressure stream of hydraulic
fluid from severed line (resulting from
overstress, natural fatig.ie, or being struck).
•	 Impact by whipping hose resulting from severed
hydraulic line,
(10) Welding and Chemical Burns
(a) Worker in contact with electrical equipment and worker
burnt by flash or flying particles from electric/gas
welding.
(b) Worker using chemicals comes in contact with highly
corrosive agents (battery fluids, cleaning agents).
(11) Suffocation
(a) Workers exposed to natural elements such as:
•	 Mud/dirt slides.
•	 Inrush of water when intersecting natural pocket.
•	 Roof or rib fall.
e	 Gas seepage into working area.
(b) Workers exposed to work-induced elements:
•	 Smoke or other toxic gas from mine fare or
explosives.
C.	 HAZARD ANALYSIS
Given a new design. it might be argued that the regulations address all
the hazards associated with equipment. This is not always true for the
fallowing reasons, (1) new designs may introduce new sources of familiar
t	
hazard's as well as totally new hazards, and (Z) even though regulations exist
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and are enforced, injury data show that workers continue to be seriously hurt
at a greater frequency than other relatively similar industries (1); this
suggests that we are not fully aware or in control of the more serious
hazards. For these reasons a systematic approach to isolating key has arils and
designing new systems accordingly is necessary.
The results of the hazard identification analysis are of immediate use
' in finding where major problems in the design exist. Identifying the major
problem areas tells the evaluator if a new design offers major improvements
over existing systems. As many new designs may have hazards similar to
existing systems, a good first step is to describe these major hazards as a
function of their percentage contribution to serious injuries. Tables 2-1
through 2-10 display the relative ranking of the nine most prominent accident
classes of the eleven accident types listed in Section 11-B t above.
1.	 Major Accident Causes
In 'Table 2-1 1 the list of major accident causes clearly indicates
that roof, rib and face fallsp haulage, machinery, and handling materials
contribute the largest portion to fatalities and disabling injuries. The
Table 2-1. Breakdown of Major Accident Causes by Fatalities
and Nonfatal Disabling Injuries
Accident Causal Category 	 Avg % Contribution to Serious Injuries
(in order of severity) 	 Fatalities (F) Nonfatal Disabling (NFD)
	
F	 NFD
Roof/Face/Rib Falls	 47	 15
Haulage
	
23	 16
Machinery	 14	 15
Handling Material	 0	 32
subtotal
	
84	 78
Explosion/Fire	 9	 1
Electricity	 7	 3
Slips/Falls	 0	 8
Hand tools	 0	 7
Suffocation	 0	 3
Total	 100	 100
Source - MSHA Injury Statistics (1972-1978)
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remaining accidents contribute less than one fourth of the Dotal serious
injuries. Each of the nine accident causes are broken down into their respec-
tive contributing hazards (taken from the list shown in Section II-a-3) in the
remainder of this section. The percent contributions of detail hazards to the
total injuries associated with each accident category are provided where data
were available. The discussion of each table further illuminates the causes
with emphasis given to the worst hazards.
2. Hazards Related to Roof., Face, and Rib Falls
Table 2-2 indicates that the hazards which far outweigh all other
hazards deal with roof 'support being adequate (but unable to provide support
in the proper place at the right time), or inadequate due to worker inexperi-
ence, or carelessness, during the installation process. The term "adequacy"
implies that if the support had been placed in the right location and of the
proper time, it would have prevented the rock fall,. For example., machinery
geometry and volume often prevent temporary and permanent support from being
placed as close to the face as preferred. Similarly, machinery geometry and
volume, and floor conditions, often prevent temporary support being placed in
a solid position to hold up the roof. The variable nature of stress release
in strata is also a factor since this is not predictable and can occur at the
time support is placed. In all of these examples the support is adequate to
protect workers from rock falls but fails because it cannot be installed under
the conditions for which it was designed. The problem of "inadequate" support
is basically due to an insufficient amount of temporary or permanent support
being installed. The source of this problem becomes apparent when it is recog-
nized that most of the serious injuries involve workers with less than five
years of experience in their task area (see aggravating factors). The compli-
cated nature of strata mechanics demands considerable experience in knowing
where, and how many supports should be placed.
Venturing under unsupported roof to :install temporary support, or moving
away from the protection of a cab to inspect a possible equipment failure under
unsupported roof, seem to be inherent in most conventional mining systems.
Though it appears that workers accept this as as job-related risk, it seems that
considerable effort should be expended to reduce this inherent problem in these
task areas.
3. Hazards Related to Haulage
Table 2-3 shows that the major contributor to haulage type injuries
(pinches and squeezes) is the necesai,ty for miners to work in proximity to the
haulage equipment. For example, workers perform cleanup tasks during the
loading process in the immediate vicinity of shuttle cars and bridge conveyors.
These machines can pinch workers between the machine and rib. Workers couple
and uncouple railcars as part of normal haulage operations and are required to
be in between the cars during the performance of this task. Understanding that
many haulage type tasks are performed in a poorly lighted environment where
machine operators may not see other workers, further clarifies why these tasks
are extremely hazardous.
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4. Hazards Related to Machinery
The major problem demonstrated by Table 2-4 and often encountered
with tramming or moving equipment in underground mines, is negotiating the
narrow entries. Large, slow moving equipment, such as longwall systems, allows
workers time to move out of the way. Other types of lighter, less stationary
equipment, such as face drills, cutters, loaders or roof bolters, move more
quickly and are subject to rapid, unstable movement when traveling over an
uneven floor. This same unstable movement also occurs when these machines are
operating. For example, a face drill or cutter which encounters a very hard
parting in the coal may bind and impart a torque large enough to displace the
machine sideways. Workers in the vicinity may not be expecting this kind of
movement, or may not see the machinery if lighting is poor or their vision
obstructed. Inexperience is also a major contributor to these hazards because
workers may not have the awareness necessary to always position themselves
safely while equipment is operating.
5. Hazards Related to Handling Material
The problem of workers' physical capabilities being exceeded
composes almost three fourths of the disabling injuries in Table 2-5, below.
Since most of these injuries occur during lifting or pulling various
materials, it appears that weight, size, and the physical mechanics a worker
employs during Lifting or pulling, work together ^Lo cause injuries. For
example, an extremely strong individual can be injured if he attempts to lift
a cumbersome component without using the proper technique '(i.e., not using the
leg muscles in conjunction with the back muscles). It is also understandable
that numerous injuries are caused by dropping material since many supplies and
machine, components are not easily grasped. It is important to note that
existing data indicate - aw coal operations considerably increase the chance of
handling material injuries because the restricted space requires awkward
physical positions.
6. Hazards Related to Explosions and Burns
Gas and dust explosions are a considerable problem because of the
many ignition sources present in the mining environment. Cutting machines
generate sparks when striking rock. Sparks are also generated when pounding
spikes into brattice cloth, by the static discharge between closely operating
machines, or due to shorts on equipment or power cables..- 'fable 2-6 confirms
that the difficulty with controlling_ spark generation', coupled with monitoring
gas at the right time and in all the right locations, contribute tomaking the
explosion hazard unpredictable and difficult to control.
Injuries caused by explosives, suffer the same degree of variability in
controlling the causes. Variability in coal and rock strata effect the
direction and degree to which fracturing occurs from explosive forces. For
example, the explosive shot could be directed out of the charge hole if the
surrounding strata is extremely hard. Workers supposedly out of the line of
the blast could experience a higher exposure to deflected, flying debris as a
2-14
Machinery X Contribution to Fatalities
and Disabling Injuries
Table 2-4. Major Contributing Hazards to Machinery Injuries
Workers are struck by machinery in the process
of tramming and moving machinery in close
quarters at the face. (Non-stationary equip-
ment such as roof support and loading type
machinery are major contributors to this hazard)
Workers are struck or caught by machinery during
maintenance, clean-up, or support operations
	 59
- insufficient guards
- Bad lighting and obscured vision prevents
operators seeing other workers in vicinity
- Non-stationary equipment is difficult to
control as a result of forces imparted on
machinery during cutting or roof support
operations
Other contributing hazards are:
- Inexperience/carelessness
41
Machinery fails as a result of being
overstressed
Total
	
100
Aggravating factors low coal restricts the movement of workers close to
machinery and prevents workers from being able to escape hazards.
References:
"Industrial Engineering Study of Hazards Associated with Underground Coal Mine
Production," Vol. I and 11, Theodore Barry b Associates, December 10, 1971.
"Study of Fatal Accidents Involving Underground Coal Loading Machines," MSHA,
1978.
"Comparison of Injury Hazards in Different Coal Seam Heights," MSHA, Hudson,
S., 1976.
"MSHA Detail Injury Summary," Report #CM341L2, 1976-1979.
"Accident Analysis by Functional Classification for Bituminous Coal Mines in
4 ft. to 8 ft. Seam Heights," FMC Corp., December 1972.
Table 2-5. Major Contributing Hazards to Handling Material Injuries
Handling Material Hazards	 X Contribution to DisablingInjuries
Worker's physical capabilities are exceeded
because objects are too heavy or cumbersome to
handle. Tasks which act as the major sources
of this hazard are:
- Handling supplies (such as timber, tools,	 39
and equipment (fans, pumps, conveyors}
etc.) ,
Performing machine maintenance and handling 	 15
machine components
- Handling power cables or cable reeling
	
6
Handling coal, rock, and other waste 	 8
- Coupling, blocking or chocking mine cars 	 3
Workers are struck by material as a result of 	 6
material being stored in an unstable position
(mostly roof support materials)
Other miscellaneous or not otherwise: classified	 23
causes
Total
	
100
Aggravating factors - low coal displays a statistically significant larger
number of injuries because workers are constrained by restricted space in
which to handle materials, and are usually in awkward positions when handling
material.
References:
"Comparison of Injury Hazards in Different Coal Seas Heights," MSHA,
Hudson, S., 1976•
NSHA Detail Injury Summary," Report #CM341L2, 1976-1979.
i
i
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Table 2-6. Major Contributing Hazards to Explosion/Burn Injuries
% Contribution to Fatalities
Explosion /Burn Hazards	 and Disabling Injuries
Workers in area of methane release, and
- Poor ventilation causes gas and dust build 	 38
up in presence of an ignition source
- Inadequate monitoring of gas allows gas
build up and ignition
Workr;rs are in-line of explosive blast 	 28
Explosive materials are detonated prematurely	 1.
due to age, or improper design of detonating
device (stray signals)
Workers exposed to hiGh pressure releases from	 8
hoses on machinery while performing maintenance
Miscellaneous or not otherwise classified causes 	 25
Total	 100
References:
"Analysis of Injuries Associated with Explosives in Coal Mines," MSHA,
Tierney t M. P., 1976.
"MSHA Detailed Injury Summary," Report #CM341L2, 1976-1979.
result of the denser outburst. Similarly, strata conditions could direct the
blast through a weak rib into a working area in another entry. Worker inext
perience or carelessness cannot be overlooked as another contributing hazard
in both personal exposure and in exposing other workers because of poor cam-
munication at the time of detonation.
7.	 Hazards Related to Electricity
The underground mining environment contributes significantly to the
electrical hazard. For example, power cables experience substantial wear from
being run over by machinery, abraded by rough or sharp corners or rock, and
corroded by acidic, standing, ground water. The failure rate of cables varies
depending on the degree to which they are affected by these variables. This
results in workers not knowing if the cable is shorted when they handle it and
2-17
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isubsequently exposing themselves to potential electrical shock. The data pro-
vided in Table 2-7 confirms this problem. The electrical hazard is further
aggravated by poor lighting (such that workers cannot readily see if power
switches are activated on machinery, or if cables are abraded), and mine condi-
tions such as standing water, which may hide a shorted cable.
Trolley wires are usually exposed to al=low good electrical contact with
the trolley pole. These bare high voltage lines are acs ever present hazard to
those walking or crossing the roadways which contain the lines, as well as
those who must pass near a line while boarding, riding, or leaving a railcar.
Low coal aggravates this hazard considerably.
8.	 Hazards Related to Slips and Falls
The greatest contributors to slip and fall ,injuries (Table 2-8) are
(1) loss of footing, (2) being caught off balance or struck when operating or
working around equipment, and (3) handling material. Though carelessness is
sometimes a factor in these injuries, it is equally important to recognize that
poor lighting, obstacles (such as fallen rock, stored materials, etc.), machirt-
ery operating in close quarters, and wet floors are aggravating factors. For
example, a worker handling heavy timber in a wet environment may more easily
slip and fall or strike another worker causing him to fall. Sometimes the
chain of events leading to an injury is complex. For example, in cases of
machine--related incidents a worker not injured when bumped by a machine may be
knocked off balance and suffer a severe injury as a result of the fall.
Table 2-7. Major Contributing Hazards to Electrically Related Injuries
Electrical Hazards
	
% Contribution to fatalities
and Disabling Injuries
Worker must handle energized electrical com-
	 57
ponents and contacts conductor with tool (major
component is handling/splicing cable, 25.0)
Workers handling rail-car related electrical 	 20
components (trolley wire or pole)
Miscellaneous or not otherwise. classified
	 23
causes
Total
	 100
F	 Refeience
"Analysis of Electrical Injuries in the Coal Mining Industry," MSHA, Mason, W.
and Seale, E._, 1980.
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9	 Hazards Related to Handtools
The source of the uajor handtool hazards (Table 2-9) is often the
type of tool chosen for a job and the manner in which the tool is used. For
example, an incorrectly sized wrench used to loosen or tighten bolts could very
easily slip. Similarly, a crowbar (which is usually applied to bar down loose
mock) used as a jack to install a machine component could very easily slip or
be overstressed and break. Another problem experienced is the applii,aton of
Coo much force on a tool which results in the tool breaking. A sec4,,ary
consequence of the incorrect use of tools is workers often being struck by the
broken tool or chirps from the object worked on. It should be noted that this
hazard category considers other sources besides carelessness. For example,
tools used for breaking rock (such as alcdge hamers) often expose workers to
injury from fragments even though the tools are being handled properly.
10. Hazards Related to Suffocation
In the underground environment it is important to note that mine
refuse such as dirt, rock or mud must be stored and periodically transported
out of the mine. Refuse stored in overhead bins often clog in the process of
filling rail cars. One of the major hazards shown in Table: 2-10 0 related to
refuse, occurs when workers try to unclog the bin from underneath or the top
and are entrapped in the rapid slide of material when the bin is freed of the
obstruction.
Table 2-9. Major Contributing Hazards to Handtool Injuries
Handtool Hazards
	
% Contribution to
Non-Disabling Injuries
Tools handled carelessly causing them to slip
	 68
or break
Workers struck by chips of objects being worked
	 18
on, or broken tools
Workers struck by tools in the hands of coworkers 	 2
Tool is defective and slips or breaks	 2
Tool. is dropped on self or dropped from above
	 1
Other miscellaneous or not otherwise classified 	 9
Total	 100
Reference:
"Handtool Injuries in Coal Mines," MSHA, Seale, E., 1979.
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Table 2-10 Major Contributing Hazards to Suffocation Injuries
Suffocation Hazards	 % Contribution to >ratali.ties
Workers exposed to refuse slides in normal
	 26
operations
Inrush of Water 	 26	 A
Can seepage into working area as a result of	 14
insufficient or inoperative sensing systems
Surface-related fatalities	 34
Total	 100
Reference:
"Suffocation, Drowning and Asphyxia Fatalities in Coal and Metal/Monmetal
Mining," MSHA, Mason, W., 1979.
The presence of water and gas in underground mines is a natural occur-
rence. Occasionally, large pockets of water (such as artesian wells or under-
ground springs) are intersected, resulting in a rapid inrush of water which
engulfs workers. The gas seepage hazard usually occurs in sections that have
already been worked. Workers, unaware of the seepage, suffocate due to lack
of oxygen.
The consistent theme throughout the above tables and discussion is that
Workers are exposed to hazards because of (1) inexperience or lack of training,
(2) working in an extremely dangerous environments and (3) the nature of the
tasks they perform. It appears that equipment design is also strongly related
to hazard exposure as a function of task. This was especially clear in injuries
associated with rock falls, machinery, and haulage. Examination of equipment
and how it is used reveals existing designs require workers to install tempo-
rary support under unsupported roof. perform support tasks close to operating
machinery, or work in between moving machinery. Also coupled with task expo-
sure is the requirement for workers to handle heavy, cumbersome materials and
machine components. Although some of these hazards are somewhat mitigated by
regulation, it appears accidents could be substantially reduced via designs
that are more sensitive to built-in hazards, with particular attention to the
unforgiving mine environment, and worker error.
After identifying familiar hazards and determining which will be major
problems in a new design, it is then necessary to isolate new hazards. Because
operating data are not available, it is necessary to use the system failure and
human interaction method to identify new hazards. A brief example, to provide
2-21
the reader with the sort of analysis intended, is the rapid variation of
temperature to fracture coal. The ways in which this process co lild go out of
control through sudden release of heat or coolant, would represent unique
failures compared to ex%stinh technology. Identifying the tasks that would
bring workers into contact with these failures completes the description of
the unique hazards associated with this system.
The system may be envisioned as having a reservoir to contain the gas or
liquid used as the injection medium, a temperature inverter to add or remove
heats a pressurizer to build up injection pressure, and an injector which
vents the medium into drill holes in the face. Workers monitoring the
temperature inverter and pressurizer components could be exposed to severe
burns due to high or low temperature release if valves or 'piping failed.
Similarly, injector operators could be exposed to the same hazard if injector
nozzles or valves failed. 'inhaling or touching the injection medium could
also be hazardous. This would not only be a hazard to system operators and
helpers in the event of pressure release, but also to workers performing
routine maintenance and handling refill containers
Though there would probably be no information available to determine the
degree of exposure of workers to new hazards, the hazard analysis at least
indicates that workers could be injured by these hazards. Whether or not
workers will be injured is a function of how well the design reduces their
exposure. This will be addressed when the remainder of the .,zthodology, is
developed.
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SECTION III
MINE SAFETY REGULATIONS
A. PURPOSE OF SAFETY REGULATIONS
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (Public Law 91-173) and its
respective amendments was designed to regulate working conditions in view of
historical injury data which shows that the mining industry exposes workers to
extremely unsafe and unhealthful working conditions. The safety regulations
govern everything from worker sanitation facilities to design standards for
controlling the natural environment, and equipment in which workers perform
their functions. The intent is to provide a safe working envelope within the
total mine environment. Though it is understood that advanced systems may not
necessarily resemble or operate the same way as existing technology, it seems
reasonable that at a minimum, advanced systems should prove their integrity by
meeting the intent of these regulations. Furtherp it is hoped that they Would
provide a substantially greater measure of safety through improved design. The
following summary of the safety regulations, gs a function of their respective
major accident classifications, is provided to clarify the intent of existing
safety regulations. The health regulations, though equally important, are
addressed in a separate document (16). This information will be important for
evaluating the design integrity of new concepts.
B. SUMMARY OF THE SAFETY REGULATIONS
The following summary of safety regulations is organized by major
accident cause. This information is provided as an adjunct to the accident
and hazard relationships developed in Section II, and provides the evaluator
with a sound basis for making a qualitative assessment of new concepts.
1.	 Injuries Due t^- hoof, Rib, or Face Falls
The intent of regulations in the area of ground control is to
protect workers from potential falls or bursts of rock caused by high pressures
exerted on the roof and ribs by the overburden. These regulations also try to
prevent situations that could jar the strata loose, such as explosions of gas.
The general regulations call for an approved roof control plan which specifies
where roof support devices (sue; as timber or roof bolts) will be located, and
what the entry and pillar dimensions must be. Variations in strata conditions
permit some flexibility in the .content of an approved plan. The regulations
also address the periodic testing of roof support devices to insure their struc-
tural and holding integrity. Detailed procedures for using temporary support
when recovering roof support devices are also set forth. To prevent strata
disturbance in the event of explosion, ventilation is required to keep gas
buildup at non-explosive levels. The ventilation regulations are developed in
greater detail when the hazard of explosion is discussed later in this section.
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2. Injuries Resulting from Haulage-Belated Equipment
As indicated by the haztl yd analysis of Section 11, the basic hazard
associated with haulage equipment is workers getting squeezed between objects
or machinery. The intent of regulations in this area is to provide a means of
warning workers of the hazard. For example, audible warning signals are re-
quired on all haulage vehicles. Reflectors are also required to assist workers
in identifying approaching vehicles. Vehicle headlamps are required to improve
operator visibility and also warn other approaching vehicles. Jacks and other
lifting devices are required to assist workers in moving debris out of the way,
performing equipment maintenance, or moving equipment which may be stuck. To
insure better operator control of haulage vehicles, two independent brake
systems are required. Additional requirements for guards on haulage equipment
address the hazard of entrapment in rotating or moving components. Finally,
vehicle traction and ^ ;ontrollabil, ity are regulated by requiring sanding devices
for slippery areas and specifying that haulage ways be kept clear of debris.
3. Injuries Related to Machinery
The object of these requirements is to prevent workers from being
otruck or entrapped by machinery and components, which may catastrophically
fail under toad, or may be difficult to control in the course of performing
maintenance or making machine adjustments. For these reasons, guards are re-
quired in conjunction with easily accessible "panic bars" or shut-off switches.
Automatic shut-off switches are required on hand -held power equipment. All
face machinery is required to have falling object protection (FOP) to protect
operators from falls of rock and other material. All machinery, and areas
around machinery, are required to have illumination to allow workers reasonable
vision of activities. The requirements also address safe operating and mainte-
nance procedures such as operators communicating warnings to other workers that
a particular activity associated with machinery is starting; or, in the case
of performing inspections or maintenance, insuring that precautions are taken
to ect brakes and completely shut systems down.
4. Injuries Associated with Handling Material
Many of the materials handling activities in mining are done
manually, thus, it is difficult to set standards for how these tasks should be
done, and as a result, very few regulations exist. As many of the tasks
requiring handling heavy or cumbersome material are support tasks for ground
control or machinery, safe practi ces associated with the operation and mainte-
nance of this equipment include the material handling aspects as well. As this
is a major contributor to serious injuries, it appears that this area is in
need of system improvement.
5. Injuries Resulting from Explosion and Fire
j
Regulations related to these accident causes address both the
hazards associated with using explosives as well as hazards associated with
the possible buildup and ignition of gas. Regulations associated with using
3-2
explosives can be divided between (1') controls over the design of explosive
devices, and (2) controls over the use of explosives. Explosives are examined
for their ingredients so that the amount of poisonous gases given off after
detonation are kept to acceptable levels, and so that the detonation force is
sufficient to fracture coal but not result in catastrophic damage to the
entries. The ingredients are also tested for their ability to not detonate
other substances such as gas and dust, and for their sensitivity to outside
influence such as stray electrical signals or being dropped when handled.
Handling precautions are further stressed by requiring proper storage and
labeling of explosives.
Regulations addressing safe user practices relate to maintaining control
over the depth of the drill hole and rib thickness to minimize the amount of
debris that may leave the face at detonation and travel down entries or
penetrate ribs. The size of the charge is regulated since this also affects
the travel distance of debris. To prevent premature detonation of charges,
ignition cables and switches must be designed as fail safe as possible.
Explosions and fires may also result from the ignition of gas and dust
released from coal. Regulations in this area first defiue what is meant by
"gaseous" and then address flammable mixtures of air, gas, and dust under
various mine conditions. Stringent specifications are set forth for all face
equipment (i.e., cutting and loading machines, and haulage equipment) since
much of the gas is released during the cutting process. These specifications
include periodic methane checks, ventilation of battery enclosures, flame and
spark arrestors on all electrical connections, and fail safe cable design. In
addition, flame tests are required on all equipment where there is a potential
for heat buildup due to friction (such as on conveyors). Gas may seep into
enclosures containing electrical connections. Therefore, as an additional
precaution against possible failure of spark arresting systems, the regulations
require explosion proof enclosures around major electrical components and
connections. The regulations also try to exert a certain amount of control
over the mine environment in the event explosion and fire does occur by
requiring installation of sprinkler systems, Eire fighting equipment, escape
ways (two ways out), and use of non-flammable materials for stoppings.
6.	 injuries Associated with Electrical Components
The intent of regulations in this area is to minimize the possi-
bilities of workers coming into contact with energized electrical components.
These regulations overlap with those associated with reducing the possible
ignition of gas by sparking. The regulations require that high voltage cables
and circuits be deenergized prior to performing repairs. Training and protec-
tive equipment such as rubber gloves, guards, and insulated tools are also
called for to provide additional protection when performing maintenance. All
electrical, equipment must be grounded in order to protect operators and workers
who may contact equipment when it is operating. :Additional requirements also
call for periodic testing of circuit breakers to insure power is cut off under
overload _conditions.
3_3
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7.	 Injuries Resulting from Slips and Falls
A worker being injured from a slip or fall is often the result of
carelessness or the difficult working environment (such as cramped working
areas, poor lighting, and slippery floor conditi is). As these variables are
hard to control, there are no regulations in this area. The only regulations
that might assist in mitigating this problem are those related to haulage
(i.e., sanding slippery areas and keeping haulage ways free of obstacles).
m.	 Injuries Resulting from the Use of Handtools
Handtools designed for use in mining are also used in other indus-
tries as well. Consequently, there are no regulations governing the design or
use of tools. The only regulation which remotely applies is the machinery
requirement which addresses the use of automatic shut-off switches on hand held
power tools. This is confined primarily to power drills. 'he safe use of
handtools overlaps safe operating and maintenance practices spelled out in the
regulations for ground control and machinery.
9.	 Suffocation-Related Injuries
Regulations in this area are intended to prevent workers from being
suffocated by gas or smothered by refuse. The regulations governing ventia-
tion apply to the problem of working in methane environments. Labeling certain
areas in a mine as "gassy" is an additional precaution taken to appraise
workers of the hazard. Refuse piles are required to be placed in designated
storage areas away from work areas to prevent workers from being caught in
rushes or slides of material.
C.	 THE EFFECT OF NEW CONCEPTS ON ENHANCING SAFETY REGULATIONS
The safety regulations provide workers protection from a variety of
hazards. However, workers continue to be seriously injured at markedly high
rates. Occasionally injuries may be traced to a failure to comply with the
regulations; however, an equally important factor is the failure to control
circumstances under which a component in the mining system fails to perform
the safety function for which it was designed. A component designed inaccord-
ance with regulations could fail but not reveal the failure until it is called
upon to perform its function. Breaker switches, methane monitors, or fire
suppressant systems are examples of components which may experience hidden
failures. Some mine environments are more severe than others and, therefore,
t
	
	 stress certain components more than others. Insulation breakdown on cables and
corrosion of electrical terminals occur at faster rates in extremely damp
environments or highly acidic ground water conditions. In addition to these
kinds of variables, poorly illuminated areas and standing ground water make it
difficult to both observe problems and repair them. Though the severe accident
causes such as rock falls and machinery are closely regulated, it is obvious
that variables such as these cause gaps in the regulations. Furthermore,
tightening regulations does not necessarily ensure fail safe operation. Subse-
quently, the thrust of this paper is to assist in designing new concepts that
meet the spirit of the regulations and, more importantly, display a potential
to offset the gaps in the regulations. This is discussed in greater detail in
the methodology of Sections IV and V, where examples are provided to help
define how advanced systems should perform in the key hazard areas.
SECTION IV
SAFETY EVALUATION OF NEW SYSTEMS AT THE CONCEPTUAL DESIGN STAGE
A. OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATION
The overall aim of the conceptual level safety evaluation is to identify
conceptual designs that offer major improvements over existing systems by sub-
stantially reducing exposure to hazards. It is imperative that fatalities and
disabling injuries,be reduced for all hazards, with emphasis placed on the
major hazards. As stressed in the previous section, it is anticipated that
new designs will reduce serious injuries by meeting the intent of existing
regulations and strengthening safety performance in areas where the regulations
do not suffice.. The evaluation first requires that a hazard analysis be per-
formed, and then tests the basic integrity of the design by checking its general
conformance with the regulations using an analogous existing system as a point
of reference. The evaluation examines other design strengths by first pro-
viding the means by which serious injuries can be reduced; namely, by reducing
exposure to hazards, or reducing the severity of injuries resulting from
hazards. This may be accomplished by (1) reducing the time workers are exposed
to hazards, (2) reducing the number of people exposed, (3) redesigning machinery
to provide more protection, (4) streamlining operations to remove particularly
hazardous equipment and tasks, and (5) monitoring the development of poten-
tially hazardous situations so that workers can be removed before injuries
result. The evaluator is asked to indicate which of these general accident
reduction schemes is incorporated in the new design to offset both new hazards
and the hazards which exist in analagous conventional systems. The result of
the analysis is a subjective hazard comparison of the new system against simi-
lar existing systems, with reasons why each hazard is reduced (emphasis being
particularly placed on the major hazards related to roof and face falls,
haulage, machinery, and handling materials). Basic design requirements are
provided as guidance for determining the kinds of detailed hazard reduction
schemes considered important in improving the safety performance of new
systems.
B. CONCEPTUAL LEVEL SAFETY EVALUATION
The conceptual level safety evaluation is qualitative since it serves
only as an initial examination of new concepts to identify those which show
merit. At the completion of this safety evaluation, the regulatory integrity
will have been tested, the strong points of the design identified, and the
potential impacts of improving safety will have been determined.
1.	 Definition of the New Systems
Before a new concept can be evaluated, the basic system and its
operations must be defined in sufficient detail to permit both a detailed
hazard analys?i;s and a comparison with existing equipment. The kinds of
descriptive information required to adequately define the new system are as
follows:
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(1) A description of basic system operation which includes the
means by which the system gains access to the seam, the man-
ner in which coal is extracted, and the means by which coal
is conveyed from the face to the outby loading point for
shipping.
(2) A description of the various system components and how they
interact in the process of gaining seam access, extracting
coal, and transporting coal.
(3) A description of the kinds of tasks workers perform and
approximate number of workers exposed to various levels of
risk.
(4) A description of additional equipment required to support
system operation which may include components such as genera-
tors, transformers, hoists, material for ground support,
skids, etc.
2. The Hazard Analysis
The next step is to perform a hazard analysis by drawing on the
previously assembled design information. The analysis is conducted as indi-
cated in Section II with a detailed breakdown of major system failures and
worker interaction with them. The evaluator should go beyond the historical
hazard data provided and identify both new ways in which the old hazards can
occur, as well as ways in which new hazards can arise. The evaluator should
be careful not to automatically discount hazards just because the new system
offers protection in those areas. Those aspects of the design that reduce
hazard exposure are taken into consideration later in the analysis.
3. Selection of an Analogous System
In order to assess whether a new concept meets the intent of
existing regulations, and test its integrity, the evaluator must select, for
comparison, a conventional system which is similar to the new concept. The
chosen comparison can have either "functional similarity" or "nonfunctional
similarity." The distinction is as follows:
(1)	 Functionally similar systems operate in exactly the same
environment, in essentially the same fashion, and have simi-
lar architectures. For example, both employ rotary drilling
technology of about the same scale to extract coal from a
surface environment. Another example would be two longwall
systems; one a shearer, and the other a plow.
(2)	 Nonfunctional.ly similar systems have only one thing in
common; they both may either extract or haul coal. Nonfunc-
tional comparisons have totally different architectures and
are chosen if the new technology is so different that a
functional comparison is unavailable, or if the new system
is intended to replace a conventional system for which it is
generally agreed that the conventional system is inherently
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more hazardous. A good example of a nonfunctional comparison
would be the choice of a tunnel boring concept (which is
totally integrated with the roof support system and has its
own life support system) in place of a conventional room and
pillar operation in order to provide a complete protective
envelope around workers. This would serve the purpose of
sealing workers from the inherently unsafe underground envi-
ronment. Though these systems would only be similar to the
extent that they both extracted coal., the comparison would be
made with the intent of replacing the room and pillar system
with a tunnel borer.
Note that it would be impractical to use a nonfunctional comparison to
test regulatory compliance when the new system is intended to replace an
inherently unsafe conventional system. In this case it is appropriate to
select two comparison systems: a functionally similar system for evaluation of
regulatory conformances and a nonfunctionally similar system for identifying
and assessing hazard reductions.
For examples though it may be intended to replace a room and pillar
system with the tunnel borer for safety purposes, it would be more practical ti,
check the borer's general regulatory conformance by comparing it to tunneling
equipment use in road building (i.e., OSHA regulations). This comparison would
essentially tell the designer if the tunnel borer conformed to basic safety
practices employed on tunneling type equipment. Any additional MSHA regula-
tions peculiar to the coal mining environment would also be considered.
4.	 Test of Regulatory Conformance
The results of the hazard analysis indicate hazards to which
workers will be exposed. Knowing these hazards and relating them to their
generic accident classification allows the evaluator to check general regula-
tory compliance of the new concept, with emphasis on the intent rather than the
letter of the regulations. If a new concept is at variance with the intent of
the basic regulations, the design can be altered accordingly while the concept
is still in the drawing board stage. While general regulatory conformance does
not ensure that the new concept will be safer than existing systems, it doers
indicate that there is no inherent flaw in the design and that is it reasonable
reasonable to proceed with the evaluation. Table 4-1 summarizes the regulatory
information provided in Section III and is displayed in a checklist format to
assist the regulatory test procedure. If a new design meets the intent of the
regulations but not the letter it is important to note how the concept achieves
this. An example of this would be a new single entry concept (as opposed to
the required multiple entry design,) which allows automatic sealing and venti-
lation of the working areas in the event of fire or major roof fall. The
regulation is designed to provide additional escapeways for workers in the
event of these occurrences. However, a single entry system such as this would
provide the same degree of protection, and therefore meet the intent of the
regulation (which is to separate workers from these hazards).
In the event a new hazard is identified for which there is no applicable
MSHA regulation, the evaluator may choose to reference other appropriate
regulations (such as OSHA) which may apply. These should also be noted.
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Table 4-1. Summary of Safety Regulations
General Regulations
	
Conformance
	
Manner in which New
Yee	 No	 Design Meets Intent
of Regulations
Machinery and Electrical
Regulations
Exercise safe design practices for
both standard fuel and electric
vehicles that are in general
conformance with or meet the
intent of related MSHA regulations
as applied. to the mining environment.
(e.g., safe load capacity, warning
devices, spark arrest, canopies,
cable and electrical connections).
Ground and Environmental
Control Regulations
Exercise safe design practices that
are in conformance with or meet the
intent of related MSHA regulations
as applied to mine development and
construction (e.g., control of site
subsidence, identification of hazard
areas, power line installation, venti-
lation, roof control plan, use of high
pressure lines and vessels t fire con-
trols, designated refuse areas, mine
entry design).
Operations and Maintenance
Regulations
Exercise safe design practices with
consideration to applicable MSHA
regulations related to human inter-
faces with equipment and associated
material (e.g., handling spare com-
ponents, timber, ducting, casings,
electrical and machinery operation
and maintenance).
Table 4-1. Summary of Safety Regulations (Continuation 1)
General Regulations
Explosives, Dust and Gas Control
Regulations
Exercise safe design practices that
are in conformance with or meet the
intent of MSHA regulations related
to control of dust and gas. Exer-
cise safe design practices that are
in conformancb with or meet the
intent of regulations related to
the use and storage of explosive,
combustible, corrosive, or toxic
substances.
Worker Protection Regulations
Exercise safe design practices that
that are in conformance with or meet
the intent of regulations related to
protective covering of the body
against the mine environment.
Other regulations applicable
to mitigating new hazards
(such as OSHA).
Note: Please refer to Section III. for a more detailed summary of each group
of regulations.
5. Evaluation of Safety Improvements
New concepts can reduce exposure to hazards by either reducing the
time workers are exposed, to the hazards, or by providing more protection (6).
These factors can mitigate hazards through several different approaches as
indicated by Figure 4-1. Figure 4-1 shows that there are four basic ways one
can effect a reduction in exposure. Two ways involve machinery iedesign to
provide operators and Inelpers more protection, or decreased exposure time.
For example, one of the major roof fall hazards discussed in Section II is
injury at the time temporary support is installed. A system that could cut
and install permanent support as it advanced would reduce the time for roof
Conformance
	
Manner in which New
Yes	 No	 Design Meets Intent
of Regulations
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I stresses to build up to dangerous levels. This same example could be applied
to the next hazard reduction factor, operations redesign. This means that a
new system could streamline operations and also achieve a reduction in exposure
time. The above example would allow the extremely hazardous task of setting
temporary roof support to be eliminated.
Two other ways +:hat exposure may be reduced are through reductions in
the number of workers exposed in high risk task areas (coupled with intensive
training), and through hazard monitori a l devices (such as seismic ground con-
trol devices, machine proximity sensors and warning devices, etc.). The data
in Section I1-C provided a detailed breakdown of all the major hazard areas as
a function of their respective contributions to the total number of injuries.
Using.
 the approaches for reducing hazards outlined in Figure 4-1, and coupling
these ,ideas with the major hazard areas, it is possible to derive some detailed
design guidelines for hazard reduction. The evaluator is provided the follow-
ing guidelines to illustrate the kinds of design criteria advanced systems
should meet to effect major reductions in hazards. These guidelines should
also stimulate the designer ' s imagination toward means of controlling new
hazards which way be introduced by a proposed design:
(1) improving Ground Control and Equipment Protection
(a) System should provide permanent support at the face (to the
extent cutter geometry allows) as part of systematic support
plan as the system cuts and advances, and should not allows
workers to be under unsupported roof at any time (particu-
larly within the distance from the face to the last permanent
support). Systems should test the roof and establish support
positions as well as supplemental support without requiring
workers to be exposed to unstable geologic conditions.
(b) System should not require workers to perform tasks outside
of equipment protection when in unsupported roof areas.
(c) System should provide dynamic feedback on ground control
conditions, and also monitor unusual geologic conditions
(i.e., faults, potential rock bumps). Systems should also
provide alternative actions (such as stress data feedback
via computer) to allow immediate changes in the systematic
ground support pl,n.
(d) Workers should be trained and certified for major tasks.
(e) System should incorporate quality control programs to monitor
degradation in ground control components (such as designing
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance progrnms based on the
severity of the mine environment; this would consider a
variability in dampness and degree of groundwater acidity
which effect corrosion rates of components).
(f) System should utilize permanent and temporary ground control
components designed such that they cannot be dislodged by
impact resulting from machinery or other objects.
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(2) Reducing pinch and Squeeze as Typically Related to Haulage
(a) Maintenance and operating areas in and around equipment
should be illuminated to allow good machine component
visibility and should. generally place workers in areas where
equipment or equipment components are not traveling or
subject to rapid movement.
(b) Moving equipment should monitor obstructions and provide
dynamic feedback to vehicle controls to prevent collision
with other v4hicles, people, or rib.
(3) Machinery Improvements
(a) Equipment and lighting should be designed to allow unobscured
vision of all operations; and equipment should monitor the
presence of workers in areas that may expose workers to im-
pact or being, caught. Guards against catch points should be
provided and equipment should incorporate devices which allow
operation only when guards are in place. If visual confirma-
tion of a repair is required, positive "system up" signals
should be provided without requiring workers to adjust sy^ttem
when it is operating,
(b) Equipment should be stable under all operating conditions sc•
as to prevent undamped, uncontrollable system responses which
can cause impact with other equipment or workers in the area.
'Equipment should have feedback control systems that leveli,ze
power input when components are overstressed.
(c) Workers should be trained and certified for major tasks.
Training aids (including simulators) should be an integral
part of the system.
(4) Reducing Handl ing Material 'Hazards
(a) Workers should have appropriate support equipment that
provides automated handling and positioning of heavy,
cumbersome mate-vials (e.g., ground control materials).
(b) Work areas shoul l
 be designed to incorporate appropriate
space and support equipment to allow for stable storage of
equipment components and material as part of the total mine
design.
(5) Reducing Explosion/Burns
(a) Ventilation system should continuously monitor gas and dust
buildup and should alter, ventilation to maintain established
MSHA safe levels, and should provide warning simultaneously
to all workers (e.g., unsafe areas where gas is building up
at a faster rate than ventilation system can handle). Venti-
lation system should fault isolate areas where fire initiates,
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and activate control systems to seal off area and provide
ventilation to areas where workers may be forced to remain
until the fire is extinguished.
(b) Snot setting and blast systems should not expose workers to
premature blast or flying debril resulting from blast (e.g.
remotely controlled drill. and shot setting system).
(b)	 Reducing Electrical Hazards
Workers shorald not be exposed to handling electrically energized
components through design incorporation of electrical diagnostics
and fault identification systems, and by automatic disconnect
systems that cut off power at the sources.
(7)	 Reducing Slips and Falls
Bork areas should be systematically designed to allow room for
materials and debris to be stored outside the work area.
(d) Improving Handtool Design
Handtools should be configured for specific tasks and incorporate
positive looking devices to prevent slippage. Where possible,
fasteners that can allow the removal or installation of components
without the use of large or heavy toolo should be employed.
(9) 'Reducing Suffocation Hazards
(a) Work and storage areas should be designed to prevent intru-
sion of stored material into areas where workers are present
as part of the mine system design. Where necessary to store
refuse in bins or hoppers, worker interface in the process
of unclogging should be eliminated through the use of vibra-
tors or pre-crushing treatment.
(b) Control of gas buildups as it contributes to suffocation
coincides with the proposed ventilation criterie related to
explosions and fires.
G.	 Comparison of Hazards Associated with New Designs Against the
Conventional Comparison
The 'last step in the conceptual level analysis is to examine the
previously developed information on hazards and features designed to offset
these hazards t and then determine wl.her the new design offers a substantial
improvement in comparison with an an,^iogous conventional system. The first
step in this process is to identify the general hazards associated with the
comparison system. Figure 4-2 assists in this task by relating generic classes
of mining activities and conventional equipment to their associated accident
categories. The evaluator simply selects the desired comparison activity and
equipment from the left hand column and notes which major accident categories
F
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the conventional system normally experiences. The detailed hazards follow
directly from Section 11-3 once the accident classification is found.
At this stage, all the information necessary to coipare the two systems
is available. Since there is particular concern with fatalities and permanently
disabling injuries, a good measure is whether the new system will reduce those
serious injuries. A simple judgment of "less than," Of
	 to," or "greater
than" will suffice. if injuries are expected to decrease, then the reason (in
terms of the suggested performance criteria outlined in Section IV-4) should
also be indicated. Table 4-2 ilWatrates a simple cross tabulation format
useful in making this comparison. The ground rules for using Table 4-2 are as
follows:
(1) The evaluator is not constrained to use only one type of
conventional comparison.
(2) Depending on the similarity of various accident causes and hazards,
the evaluator may choose the depth of the comparison. For example,
a remotely operated room and pillar system which replaces a conven-
tional room and pillar system would not expose workers to roof
falls. Therefore, it would suffice to make the comparison at the
level of whether roof fal=ls will be a major accident class.
(3) An estimate of the potential for di;sbbli.ng injuries must: consider
both injury frequency (exposure time) and severity (protection).
Therefore, a new design which effects either would allow one to
register a reduction in serious injuriesn
(4) if a new design displays hazards similar to its comparison system
and increases exposure trough a larger labor force, greater expo-
sure tame, or less proteQtion, it must be assumed that the potential
for serious injuries will increase, unless it incorporates mi.ti-
gating design factors.
The, last step is to sunmaar ze the serious injury potentials of the new
system. This sunmiary should emphasize the performance of the new system in
the areas of roof falls, haulage, machinery, and handling materials-, which
comprise more than 75Z of serious injuries for conventional systems (see
Section 11-0. These areas must show a reduction in order for the design to
be considered truly viable. Though it is desirable to demonstrate reductions
for the remaining hazards, these have little impact on reducing the serious
injuries experienced by current-day equipment.
7.	 Illustrative Example
A simple example can be used to demonstrate the whole procedure.
one examp a of an advanced concept is a borehole hydraulic coal mining .system
(17). This system was designed to replace a room and pillar operation by
establishing a borehole network over the coal seam and operating the hydraulic
cutters (placed down the borehole) from the surface. The hydraulic cutters use
the jetting force of water to cut the coal and form a cylindrical cavity having
a radius equal to the reach of the jet. The loosened coal is pumped out of the
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Table 4-2. hazard Comparison of the Now System Against the
Conventional Comparison
Now System Designation
Description	 Major	 Major	 Potential for	 Reasons
of Conven-	 Hazards	 Hazards	 Disabling	 for
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scavity in slurry form and vented directly into a settling tank where it is then
pumped to the prep plant. A functionally similar system would be the auger
since it extracts coal using a boring process and utilizes a rig, drill stems,
and support equipment similar to the borehole system. For simplicity we will
only examine the process of hauling the coal out of the cavities. The auger
accomplishes this task by using an overhead conveyor to move coal to trucks;
and the borehole effects coal transport out of the cavity by slurrying the coal
into a settling tank.
The system failure and human interaction approach outlined in Section II
reveals the basic hazards to which the one or two auger workers are exposed
during clean up around the conveyor (see the haulage and machinery hazards):
(1) Workers can be struck by the conveyor chain drive which can fail
under load.
(2) Workers can be struck by conveyor fragments resulting from belt
failure under load, or can become entrapped in the moving conveyor.
(3) Workers can be struck by debris falling off the conveyor.
(4) Workers can suffer injuries in the process of moving large debris
which has fallen off the conveyor.
The borehole system is a closed loop hydraulic circuit which only re-
quires one person to monitor system operation (17). This person monitors the
operation from a cab mounted close to the point where water under high pressure
is pumped in, and the slurry is pumped out. The major hazard the worker is
exposed to is a high pressure burst from either the input or output lines.
Table 4-2 would be filled out as follows. The conventional comparison
would be the auger conveyor. The accident class would. be  haulage and the
hazards would be listed as outlined above. The new system hazards are not
exactly the same because the borehole eliminates both the need for a conveyor
and the subsequent cleanup task. The new hazard introduced is the possible
burst of the pressure lines. For this we would compare it to a conventional
oil drilling or gas well operation. In both comparisons the expected result
is a reduction in serious injuries for the following reasons:
(1) The borehole system reduces the number of workers required for
support tasks on augers and drill rigs.
(2) The borehole system provides protection by placing the one exposed
worker in a cab and, being a closed hydraulic circuit, does not
require the worker to be under a conveyor, close to a drill rig,
or handling cumbersome materials. The hazardous cleanup task has
been removed and replac,d by a monitoring task.
It can be concluded from this analysis that the borehole system looks 	 T
promising because it offers a sizeable reduction in disabling injuries by
effecting one of the more severe accident classes. The next step would be to
project what the reduced injury level might be as a result of the removal of a
hazardous task and reduction in labor force. This is developed in the follow-
ing quantitative portion of the methodology.
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SECTION V
SAFETY EVALUATION
AT THE PRELIMINARY DESIGN STAGE
A.	 OVERVIEW OF THE EVALUATION
The preliminary design stage safety evaluation is a quantitative projec-
tion of the hazard and injury reductions identified in the qualitative analy-
sis. In light of the quantitative nature of this section of the methodology
(-
	
	 it is appropriate to restate the overall requirements; namely, the overall
projected injury rate should not exeed 40-45 injuries per million man hours
and the disabling injury and fatality rates should respectively not exceed 30
and 0.2 injuries per million man hours. If a new system meets these require-
ments it will exhibit a level of safety commensurate with the trends of
existing, similar industries which are safer. As with the qualitative analy-
sis, emphasis'is placed on projecting the effect of a new design on reducing
C
	
	 fatality and disabling injury rates. Injury frequency and severity are equally
important and are addressed respectively by reducing hazard exposure time or
increasing worker protection. Injury frequency is affected by using exposure
'i
	
	 time indices which are the fractional changes in task times of the new system
as compared to an analogous existing system for similar risk populations. The
risk reduction factors which can be reflected in an exposure time index are
machinery redesign and operational changes (removing hazardous tasks). This
index can be further influenced by labor force reductions and quality of
training. The exposure index for a given task is multiplied by the injuries
associated with the same hazard and task of the conventional analogous system
to project the new system safety performance.
Reductions in severity are measured by subjectively determining the
aggregate effect of new protective design measures on the body component
injuries associated with the analogous conventional system. The analysis
examines how injuries for existing systems might be reduced by employing the
protective design measures of the new system. The new system must offer pro-
tection for the body areas that are the most exposed and have the most severe
injuries in order to be judged as a sound design. The risk reduction factors,
which can be grouped as protective measures, are machinery redesign and
environmental controls and monitors.
The intent of the projections is to establish the relative difference in
the magnitude of injuries between a new design and existing systems. The
projection of the magnitude of injuries was considered the only realistic goal
because of the necessity to make simplifying assumptions in order to remove
some of the complicating aspects of the analysis (such as multiple task and
hazard interactions). Realism is incorporated by presenting both the new
design and injury projections to a group of experts in mining safety and
adjusting the projections in light of their experience. Other aspects which
effect injuries such as the possible need for comprehensive training programs
and any unusual site characteristics are also incorporated at this time.
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B.	 DISCUSSION OF EXPOSURE REDUCTION VARIABLES AS RELATED TO RISK
POPULATIONS, 'EXPOSURE INDI^AS, AND SEVERITY INDICATORS
This .section discusses tha influence the exposure reduction factors have
on injury frequency and severity by respectively reducing hazard exposure time
or increasing protection. The exposure reduction factors were introduced in
Section IV-B, and are summarized as ullorvs:
(1) Reduce exposure time to hazards associated with various tasks.
(2) Remove dangerous tasks completely.
(3) Increase protection against hazards and allow exposure time to
remain the same.
(G) Provide hazard warning devices as a means of protection.
The quantitative measure of these possible means of reducing hazards
requires a detailed identification of the populations at risk, and development
of exposure time and injury severity indicators.
1.	 Definition of Exposure Reduction Factors
The exposure reduction factors which affect either exposure time
or injury severity are: redesigning machinery, streamlining mining operations,
reducing the size of the risk population: and providing a better means of
monitoring the mining environment and workers. As stated in the conceptual
level design evaluation, machinery can be redesigned to reduce exposure time
or provide greater protection. For example, exposure to roof falls can be
reduced by increasing the cutting rate of a mining machine. If i cutter can
be designed to advance quickly, such that permanent support can be installed
almost immediately, then the large buildup of stresses which cause Laving can
be somewhat mitigated. This would reduce the amount of in-place tt-me during
which workers are exposed to roof fall hazards. This same approach to reduce
the roof fall hazard applies to ground control equipment. Any machinery
redesign which reduces the task time for installing temporary or permanent
support will assist in reducing the exposure to rock fall injuries. Another
approach might be to design machinery which provides positive protection
against falls and does not require workers to leave the protection until the
task is completed and they have moved to an area under permanently supported
roof.
,a
Exposure time can also be reduced by removing particularly hazardous
tasks or operations. One example provided in Section IV-B referred to stream-
lining the roof support process by installing permanent support as the new
system advanced. This would alleviate the need to place temporary support
(such as timber or chocks) as required with existing room and pillar. systems.
Another useful example of making operations more efficient is the hydraulic
borehole miner and conventional auger comparison discussed in Section IV-B.
In this example, the borehole improved the efficiency of the haulage process
by removingthe need for an overhead conveyor and, therefore, removed the
hazardous task of cleanup underneath the conveyor.
5-2.
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Hazard monitoring and alert devices can provide additional measures of
protection for workers. This is achievable at a macro level (the total mine
environment in which equipment operates) or a micro level (distinct components
of the mining system such as machinery). Devices .could be employed at the
macro level to monitor internal changes in strata stresses and also the trans-
fer of stresses, from one location to another (such as the transfer of stress
concentrations from the face area to the entry areas). The stress signals
could then be transformed into warning,signals for workers in the area. An
example of exerting hazard control on .a micro basis would be the use of
obstruction monitors on pinch points in machinery. These would warn workers
if their hands or feet were too close to hazardous areas on operating,equip-
ment. Similarly, equipment operators could be provided signals in the cab
warning them of workers in areas around the equipment which are not visible
from the operator 4 s compartment.
All of the above means of reducing hazard exposure have one main thrust;
namely, the reduction of injuries to the risk population. The possibility of
reducing hazard exposure by reducing the number of workers involved in
hazardous tasks cannot be overlooked.
One additional informal element that has been shown to reduce hazard
exposure is training. Training studies using injury statistics from known
populations (workers with and without formal training) suggest that comprehen-
hensive instruction in hazard identification and avoidance can contribute to a
10% reduction in injuries in the four major accident categories (i.e., roof
falls, haulage, machinery, and handling materials) (9). This methodology
assumes that a requisite level of training will accompany any new design, and
that this training will be adequate in mitigating hazards caused by operator
error. However, if the analysis suggests that normal, on-the-job training may
not adequately prevent operator error, then the potential impact this could
have on compounding hazards would be addressed during the final design review
with the group of experts. The experts would be asked to comment on the impact
operator error may have on injuries, and also asked for training suggestions
that might resolve operator problems. The following represent examples of
additional training aids:
(1) A formal task instruction program which has a well-defined syllabus
and includes, where necessary, mockups of real situations
(including equipment simulators), and instructor evaluation.
(2) Certification for major task arcal such as machinery operation and
ground control support tasks.
(3) Periodic testing, reevaluation, and retraining.
All of the above hazard reduction factors must be transformed into
comparative measures of exposure time, protection, or change in risk popula-
tions before the injury projection for the new system can be completed. These
measures are defined in the following sections.
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2.	 Definition of Risk populations
The risk population is defined as the ,group of workers exposed to
a set of hazards. Identifying the number of workers involved in task areas
that are related to major hazards is essential to measuring the impact of
improved safety. The quantitative methodology uses the fractional change in
the comparable risk populations of a new system and an analogous conventional
system as one means of assessing possible design improvements (i.e., if a new
concept was similar in every way but increased the risk population in a
particularly hazardous task area then this would tend to increase injuries).
Hazards associated with slips and falls, handtools ' and suffocation are not
specific to any given task area, location ? or groups of workers and, there-
fore, do not have any particular worker task category attached to them.
However, the remaining accident categories do display is distinct task-severity
relationship. The following tables (Tables 5
-1 through 5-4) and discussion
demonstrate the relationship between task and injury frequency as a function
of each accident class and the approximate number of people involved in each
task. The evaluator is provided this information to help identify critical
tasks and worker locations that largely expose workers to serious injuries.
a. Roof and Face Fall Injuries.ries. The most important aspect of
the hazards and tasks shown in Table 5-1 and associated with ground control
and working in the face area is the location of workers in relation to the
position of the last pnrmanent support,, The ground control tasks often
require workers to be "inby" the last permanent support (i.e., close to the
face under unsupported roof), and the other face tasks (such as operating
mining equipment) place workers right at the position of the '.Last permanent
support. Other general support tasks place workers "outby" the last permanent
support (i.e., away from the face under supported roof). The distribution of
serious injuries by task clearly demonstrates that the 10-15 workers inby, or
right at the last permanent support, have a much higher chance of being
injured. The inferred reverse of this statement would also appear to be true;
namely, the chance of being injured could be greatly reduced if the permanent
support could be placed as close as possible to the face.
b. Haulage Injuries. Operating haulage equipment is a very
hazardous task because drivers are exposed to hazards driving to and from the
face as well as at the face. For example, operators must often lean out of
the cab in order to back up or observe operations. This can result in being
pinched between the machine and rib. Negotiating narrow, unlighted entries,
or maneuvering haulage equipment in close quarters with other moving machinery
in the face area can also result in operators being pinched or struck.
Helpers riding on equipment are exposed to an even greater extent to these
hazards because they have no protection. All of these elements contribute to
the major hazards shown in Table 5-2.
Performing maintenance in the face area is standard procedure since most
equipment is located in this area and repairs Are usually done in place.
However, the congestion caused by operating equipment (mining machines)
'oaders, bolters, etc.) in proximity to one another suggests that the face
Table 5-1. Relationship Between Roof and Face
Fall 'Injuries and Worker Task
Average Number Average Percentage
Major Task Areas of Workers Contributicz to Fatalities
P,
Involved in Task and Disabling Injuries
Ground Control—provide temporary
support, followed by installation 2-4 31
of permanent support (i.e., drill
roof, insert and torque bolts)
Working in the face area:
Operating mining equipment 2 6
Scaling the roof 1 6
Setting bratt ice 2 2
Operating loaders and shuttle cars 2/vehicle 3
Using handtools to break up large 1-2 3
pieces of rock and coal
Supervising and observing operations 1-2 2
Subtotal - 22
General Face area support tasks:
Cleanup 1-3 2
Machine maintenance 1-2 3
Moving cables 1-2 2
Transport supplies 2 2
Subtotal - 9
Unclassified or not otherwise specified - 38
Total 100
Reference:
"Analysis of Fall. of Rib, Roof, and Face Accidents in Underground Coal 'Mines,"
MSHA, 1976-1978.
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Average number Average Percentage
General Task of Workers Contribution to Fatalities
Involved in Task and Disabling Injuries
Operating haulage equipment such as
shuttle cars, loaders or rail cars 1-2 42
Helpers riding on equipment 1 13
in transit
Workers performing maintenance on
equipment in ;proximity to moving 1-2
haulage equipment
Workers spotting or 1-2 9
coupling rail cars
Workers rerailing rail cars 3-4 4
Workers performing clean-up 1-2 2
in the face area
Workers moving power cables 1-2 2
near the face
Workers handling supplies in 1-2 1
proximity to moving haulage
equipment
Unclassified or not - 18
otherwise specified
Total 100
References;
"Nonfatal Injuries Caused by Haulage Related Accidents in Underground Coal
Mines," MSHA, 1977.
"MSHA Detail Injury Summary," Report #CM341L2, 1976-1979.
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Table 5-2. Relationship Between Haulage
Injuries and Worker Task
i
4
i=-
area is not the safest location to perform this task. This appears evident
because the contribution of maintenance to the total serious injuries shown in
Table 5-2 is significant. As discussed in Section II, the task of spotting
and coupling rail cars is hazardous because workers usually perform this task
while the cars are moving. The possibility of being struck or pinched between
cars is, therefore, considerably increased.
C *	 Machinery injuries. The major task contributors to serious
,machinery injuries Table 5-3 involve operating and mRint.aining machinery in
the face area. As with haulage-related injuries, it appears that the amount of
equipment in the face area creates a congested work place, which increases tale
likelihood of being struck by machinery. Conventional roof bolting equipment
introduces an additional problem because workers must often manually guide the
drill and bolt when installing permanent support. If either the drill or bolt
break, the worker can be struck. Another contributor, discussed earlier, is
the instability of mining and bolting equi pment when cutting or dolling
extremely hard rock. This can result in the machine moving abruptly sideways
and striking workers in the area. Taken as a whole, these data indicate that
there is sizeable room for new designs to reduce machinery related accidents
by providing better machine stability, more protection, or streamlining
operations to reduce face congestion.
d.	 Handling Material Injuries and Worker Task. Because the
material handling task injury relationships were developed in detail in
Section II-C 9 it will suffice to simply summarize them here. Almost 70% of
the total disabling injuries are associated with the following tasks:
(1) Handling supplies (such as props or timber) and
equipment (such as fans, pumps, etc.).
(2) Performing machine maintenance and handling machine
components.
(3) Handling power cables or cable reeling.
(4) Handling coal, rocks or other debris.
The primary problem experienced in these task areas is the weight and
cumbersome nature of these objects. This results in worker's physical
capabilities often being exceeded, in which case they may either strain
muscles or drop objects on themselves or others.. This suggests that new
concepts should provide appropriate support equipment to remove some of the
tasks that contribute to overexertion.
e.	 Explosion and Burn Injuries and Worker Task. The largest
sources of explosion and firs hazards are gas, coal and dust, and explosives
(see Section II-C.). Because these accidents usually involve a large number
of workers doing a variety of tasks, it is not meaningful to break explosion
and burn injuries down by task. Existing injury data do suggest tt.at the
highest risk area for both gas and exrlosive accidents is the mine face. This
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Table 5-3. Relationship Between Machinery Injuries and Worker Task
Average number	 Average Percentage
General. Task
	
of Workers
	 Contribution to Fatalities
Involved in Task and Disabling Injuries
Operating hoof bolting equipment 2 34
Performing maintenance on equipment 1-2 13
in the face area
Operating mining equipment 2 12
Setting/remov ng/relocating props 2 3
in proximity to operating machinery
Moving cable in proximity to 1-2 3
operating machinery
Operating loading machines 2 3
Handling supplies in the face area 1-2 3
Tramming and positioning equipment 2 2
Cleanup in the face area 1-2 2
UnCi fined or not otherwise classified - 25
Total 100
Reference:
"MS11A Detail Injury Summary," Report #CM341L2, 1976-1979.
makes sense because the face is the principal area that brings together all
the elements required for an explosion; namely, gas released in the winning
process, dust, and an ignition source (such as sparks generated by cutting
machines striking rock). In the case of explosives the face area is the
primary focus of the shooting process. Subsequently, it appears that advanced
systems could provide protective measures for workers through continuous
environmental monitoring of dust and gas or, for tasks requiring handling of
nKplos ves I through replacement o£ workers With robotic devices.
f.	 Electrical Injuries. As would be expected, Table 5-4 indi-
ites that electr Gal and machine repairs are large contributors to serious
%juries. Transporting conducting materials, or moving machines that are made
S-S	 "
Table 5-4o Relationship Between Electrical
Injuries and Worker Task
,Average number
	
Average Percentage
General Task	 of Workers	 Contribution to Fatalities
Involved in 'task and Disabling Injuries
Electrical repair of cables	 1-2	 38
and equipment
Moving materials to and from the
face (such as roof bolts, Tail,	 2-4	 24
etc.) and moving equipment (such
as rerratling cars)
t
Machine maintenance and repair
	
1-2
	
13
Cable handling	 1°-2	 9
Cleanup at the face in 	 1-2	 8
proximity to equipment
Operating equipment	 2	 6
Unclassified or not	 -	 2
otherwise specified
Total
	
100
Reference:
NSHA Detail Injury Summary," Report #CM341L2, 1976-1979.
of conducting materials, and allowini, them to come in contact with energized
components (such as trolley wires), are also major contributors to serious
electrical injuries.
The trend that appears throughout the tables and discussion is the high
exposure of the face crew to the majority of the hazards in almost all of the
accident classes. This is an important :finding because it tells the designer
where the real safety improvements must be made through labor reductions, or
relocation of workers to safer areas. It is clear that the major task areas at
the face which should be targeted for improvement are ground control, operating
haulage and ground support equipment, equipment maintenance, and handling
supplies and machine components. Identification of the most hazardous task
areas allows a clearer understanding of the exposure time and protection
concepts introduced in the previous section. These concepts are defined in
detail in the following sections.
5-9
s
3.	 Definition of the Exposure Time Index.
Studies of individual worker injury histories suggest a strong
relationship between the chance of being injured and the cumulative time a
worker is exposed to hazards while performing tasks. 'Though this probability
curve varies as a function of hazard and task, the overall implication is that
injuries could be reduced if exposure time is decreased.
This concept of an exposure index has been used in studies by Pfleidt b
Krug (6), and Frantz b King (7). The Pfleider, Krug paper developed healtft-
indices for the hazards of dust and noise by first rating various mining equip-
ment in terms of dust and noise levels, and then multiplying the ratings b' the
number of men and hours exposed. The Franz, King paper developed exposure
indices which expressed the expected percent reduction in time exposed to
various hazards associated with a remotely operated continuous miner. The
i
	
	
quantitative indices developed below reflect the fractional change in task
exposure time between the new system and the analogous conventional systems.
This analysis is done for each hazard and task in those areas where machine or
operational redesign cause a change in task time.
G.	 Definition of the Measure for Severity
The severity aspect of hazard exposure was handled differently from
the exposure time index because it was more difficult to quantify. The reason
for this is because variation in injury severity is related to the protection
of the body. Early in the design of a new concept it is difficult to identify
the degree to which various parts of the body may be exposed to hazards.
Therefore, it appeared that the best measure of the effectiveness of machine
protections or hazard monitoring devices would be a general indication of the
magnitude of the injury reduction. The methodology determines the magnitude
by testing each design element to see if it protects those body components from
serious injuries which are historically associated with major hazards.
C.	 DESCRIPTION OF THE QUANTITATIVE PROCEDURES FOR PROJECTING INJURIES
The following sections dem000trate how the various reduction factors of
risk population, exposure time related elements (such as machinery and opera-
tional redesign), and protection elements, are used to actually project
injuries. The injury projection also requires the use of historical injury
data and further definition of both the new system and existing tet. 'ology from
the standpoint of design and task description. The injury data must be broken
down by both accident classification and task activity. Certain assumptions
were used to simplify the injury projection process. Since these assumptions
could materially affect the accuracy a)f the projection, it was decided to
incorporate the judgment of a group of experts in the field of mining safety
to improve the reliability. The procedure for incorporating this judgment into
the projection is also discussed. Finally$ a simple example is provided to
demonstrate the complete projection process.
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Explanation of the Injury Projection Equation Using the Exposure
Time Index
Any mathematical modeling process cannot exactly duplicate the
actual system. In the area of safety, because of the human element, this
process is made even more difficult. 'Therefore, assumptions must be made which
simplify a system enough to make it amenable to solution, but still close
enough to the real world so as to retain reasonable accuracy. The following
assumptions appear to satisfy these criteria:
(1) Yujuries are evenly distributed with time. Over a short time
period of perhaps one month, this is not true. However, if
a system is observed over a period of years, deviations from
an average, constant injury rate are not significant.
(2) Injury occurrence is directly proportional to exposure.
Depending on the hazard, this statement may not be exactly
correct. For example, the hazard of roof falls is extremely
great during the first half hour after a new face is created.
Therefore, the chance of injury is very high over a very
short time period. However, historical data do indicate an
increasing chance of injury as exposure increases. Although
a gross simplification, this assumption does permit a first
order estimate of the magnitude of the affects of reduced
exposure. To offset the problems with this assumption the
final results will be adjusted by a review group composed of
experts in mining safety.
(3) All health and safety regulations are complied with. For
example, the methodology does not consider possible worker
reluctance to wear proper clothing, and therefore, increase
injuries due to entrapment.
(4) All injur y data are representative and accurate.
(5) Changes in system safety design will be completely effective.
This is not completely accurate because very few systems
operate exactly as they were designed. Thus, the injury
projections may be somewhat optimistic. This is another
reason why the methodology has incorporated a review group
into the final analysis of new design integrity.
A simple injury projection expression was developed employing the above
assumptions. This expression incorporates the following factors:
ni	 —	 The projected injuries for a given task i and hazard in the new
system (measured in injuries per year).
Ni The total number of injuries associated with a given task i and
hazard of the analogous conventional system, used as the starting
baseline for the new system projection (measured in injuries per
year).
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rti	 -	 The exposure time index, which is a measure of the fractional
Ti	 change in task exposure time between the new and conventional
comparison systems, calculated for each hazard and accident class.
The term ti applies to the new system task time, and Ti refers
to the time required to perform the same (or similar) task in the
conventional system (dimensionless).
fi	 -	 An additional adjustment factor which encompasses the expected
changes in injury rates caused by fractional labor changes for a
given task (dimensionless).
$i	 One einal judgment factor which represents the general consensus of
opinion of the group of experts pertaining to the safety integrity
of the new system (expressed as a fractional change in injuries).
if additional comprehensive training is required, or representative
site data are also available, then the experts are asked to consi.d
er the impacts of these elements on the injuries (dimensionless).
It is easy to see that the injury rate for the ith task of the advanced
system is the following expression:
t.
ni Ni 
T1 
f i gi
1
The projection is initially computed with a value of unity assigned to gi.
At the last step in the methodology, the group of experts is provided both the
original injury 'bevel (Ni) and the initial projection (ni) so that they
have a baseline from v iich they can judge each new design element and incor-
porate their experience to further adjust the outcome. This judgment is
summarized in the adjustment factor (gi). The adjustment process is struc-
tured and is explained later in the methodology.
The serious injury rate (Si) is determined by referring to the
percentages developed in the hazard analysis section (Section II-C) This is
expressed as follows:
S. = n. R.
x	 z k
where, Ri = the ratio (or percentage) of serious injuries to all injuries
for the analogous conventional system, for task i.
An adjustment of the serious injury rate by the group experts is not feasible
at the preliminary design stage because there is no experience available on
which to base decisions about the seriousness of injuries.
The total serious ?end non-serious injury rates for the new system are
determined by simply summing all the projected yearly injury rates for all
tasks and hazards.
5-12
jti2.	 Explanation of the Method for Projecting Severity of Injuries
if it is decided to reduce severity by providing better personal
protection (beyond standard regulatory body protection It-h as helmets, safety
goggles, etc.) then a body component exposure analysis	 be conducted. The
basic idea behind the analysis is that by providing increas„'v« body protection
to certain areas of the body, there may be a marked decrease in injuries.
As stated in the Section H-k, the evaluation of personal protection
requires a subjective measure of the relative increase in body protection of
the new system over existing systems. A subjective approach was taken because
at the preliminary design stage, the new system design elements affecting per-
sonal protection are not yet firm. For example, the preliminary design of a
new system which changes the roof contour to better distribute roof stresses,
will not have all of the details worked out pertaining to the exact design
controls for maintaining the structural integrity (under all geological condi-
tions) of the support. Prototype testing (detailed design stage) would
provide the final statement of design integrity. Thereforeo detailed injury
reduction calculations indicating the aggregate effect on injuries to the body
would not be appropriate at this time. Another reason why a more subjective
approach is better at this design stage relates to the problem of multiple
injuries. MSHA reports injury data by both frequency and severity. Each inci-
dent reported as a fatality or disabling injury in the frequency tables is
;ikewise translated into a body injury in the severity format. Generally, the
total frequency and severity counts are the same since MSHA attempts to record
the major body component contributing to the fatality or disabling injury.
However, in some cases, workers may suffer multiple injuries which result in
death or disablement. At the preliminary design stages there would be insuffi-
cient data to determine if multiple injuries could result from a given hazard.
This implies that the general magnitude of the injuries is the only reasonable
conclusion that can be drawn without actually testing and demonstrating the
new design. As a result, the approach taken in this methodology is to simply
allow some gross statements to be made about personal protection and injury
reduction.
Assumptions similar to the exposure time index discussion apply to the
assessment of severity; nzmely, (l) all injury severity data are accurate, and
(2) safety improvements in the new design will be effective to the degree
- intended. The approach to the severity analysis is outlined below:
(1) Identify the major tank areas (and from these identify hazards and
accident classes) where machinery redesign or hazard monitoring
devices may enhance worker protection.
(2) Establish the most severe body areas historically affected by the
various hazards and lack of protection for the conventional
comparison to determine the magnitude of injuries involved.
(3) Match the appropriate protective design measures with the various
hazard and accident classifications and key body areas affected.
(4) Subjectively determine whether the design adequately protects the
worker.
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(5) Summarize the results to determine if the major hazards have been
mitigated.	 u
(6) Apply an adjustment factor which reflects the degree of reduction
in serious injuries based on the consensus of a group of experts.
The experts are providn.d t.ho subjective degree of adequacy of the
protection based on the analysis and then asked to translate the
subjective findings into an expected fractional reduction in
injuries. As with the exposure time projection, any labor reduc-
tions or representative site characteristics which may influence
the quality or completeness of the protection are also included at
this time.
The injury projection expression for the protective aspects of a new
design is as follows:
bj = Bj dj
where,
bj	 The injury projection considering the incorporation of new
protective design measures, for a given accident class j
(measured in injuries per year).
Bj	 The aggregate number of historical injuries to the body
associated with a given accident class j (measured in injuries
per year) .
dj = The general consensus of the group of experts pertaining to the
integrity of the new protective device (expressed as a
fractional, change in injuries).
The most hazardous task areas and accident classes were established
through the hazard analysis explained in Section II. It was further
determined that the workers in the face area represent the risk population in
greatest need of protection. It is feasible that a new concept may elect to
provide a more protective environment and not reduce exposure time; in which
case it is important to identify what areas of the body are in greatest need
of protection against the major hazards. Table 5-5 displays the relationship
between hazards and various body components.. The relative contribution of
each body component to the total disabling injuries is defined as follows:
(1) Small - 0 - 10% of the total disabling injuries.
(2) Medium - 13 30% of the total disabling injuries.
(3) Large - greater than 30% of the total disabling injuries.
The above percentage ranges were defined by examining the percentage
contribution of each body component. (by accident class) to the total disabling
injuries resulting from the use of conventional mining equipment. This was
done by analyzing the six most recent years of MSHA body component injury data
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and calculating the mean number of injuries for each component and hazard (15).
The relative ratings of small, medium and large were selected aftelt examining
the general number of injuries out of the total. yearly occurrence associated
with each component. This was done to give the evaluator a simple, subjective
indication of the critical areas affected by hazards.
Table 5-5 indicates that serious injuries related to rock falls largely
involve the lower extremities and trunk. Because these components comprise the
bulk of an individualp it appears that some type of total protection would be
the only adequate solution. This applies similarly to the hazards associated
with haulage and machinery. In the case of haulage and other machinery
hazards, the tasks of operating equipment and performing maintenance in prox-
imity to operating equipment expose most of the body to ;impact. Conseqently,
new protective concepts should strive to provide a total safety envelope
around face personnel that is independent of the variable mine environment as
well as the actions of other workers. This is a good example of the need to
consider the aggregate impact on bodily components a new design may have.
As suggested earlier by some examples in Section V-1, protection can be
provided through machinery design or hazard monitoring devices. Some addi-
tional examples are provided here to provide further direction to the designer.
System redundancies are often useful protective measures. For example, redun-
dant hydraulic circuits which include sensors for isolating major pressure
leaks, accompanied by automatic shut-down and switch to a back-up system would
allow continued component operation without exposing workers to the pressure
release hazard. Another possibility is to accept the presence of hazards but
provide a barrier between the worker and hazard. For, example, a cab and boom
arrangement used for roof inspection and support installation could establish
a barrier against roof and face, falls, and gas ignition, by isolating the
operators inside a cab equipped with a self-contained life support system.
The relative effect design changes have on reducing severity is the next
element that must be determined. The following ratings reflect the worth of
varying degrees of protection and are provided to assist in placing subjective
values on design changes:
(l) if a new design incorporates protective measures which establish a
complete protective envelope for workers, then it is highly
probable that the major hazards will be mitigated.
(2) If a new design incorporates protective measures that are fairly
complete (i.e,, they protect those exposed body areas that
contribute the largest proportion of serious injuries to a given
accident class),, then it is fairly likely that the major hazards
will be mitigated.
(3) If a new design incorporates protective measures which are
incomplete (i.e., the measures employed still leave opportunities
for workers to expose those areas of the body which contribute
substantially to serious injuries), then major hazards will be
only marginally mitigated.
:n
(4) If a new design offers protective measures no different from
existing systems, and experiences the same hazard potentials, the
hazards will not be mitigated and the injuries would most likely
remain the same.
(5) If a new design offers few protective measures: has a new (or the
name) potential hazard in comparison to an analogous conventional
system, and exposes workers to a new or larger number of related
system failures, then serious injuries will most likely increase.
Each protective design element is evaluated for the applicable accident
class and the results then summarized to allow an overview of the analysis.
Table 5-6 is provided as an example to demonstrate how the results of the
severity analysis might be presented. In summarizing the results of this
analysis, it is important to indicate whether the new design protects the body
i
	
	
components most severely effected by hazards, and whether a protective envelope
or barrier against the major hazards associated with roof and face falls,
haulage, machinery, and handling materials is provided. The only step
remaining is to place a numerical measure on the subjective levels of per-
formance (i.e., the numerical definition of dj). This is accomplished by
consulting the group of experts and asking what they feel the subjective
measures would equate to in terms of reductions for both serious and total
injuries.
The total injury rates for the new system are computed by sumsn_ing all
the projected injury rates for each accident class affected, as well as those
classes not affected. Though protective measures may not apply to all accident
classes, it is perfectly feasible that hazards associated with these classes
could be mitigated through other exposure time design changes. Both projec-
ions would then be combined to form an overall assessment of safety.
3.	 Preparatory Steps Required for Making Injury Projections
The preceding sections provided the framework for making injury
projections using both exposure indices and protective design measures. Many
elements in the expressions (such as injury data, and task time data) need to
be defined in greater detail in order to project injuries. Guidance must be
provided on where to obtain injury data for both coal mining systems and other
systems which may not have immediate mining applications, but may be similar
enough to be used as a baseline for comparison. The injury data reporting
format is also important since it must conform with the analysis. Task time
data for both existing systems and the new design must be tabulated and
formated properly in order to allow an appropriate comparison of the two
systems. This section explains the sources for all the data elements, and
shows how they are organized for use in preparing the projection expressions.
a.	 Detailed Description of the New System. The new system must
be defined in terms of task times, manpower, worker locations, and machinery
design in order to have sufficient data to understand potential exposure time
reductions or the protective elements. The system description provided at the
conceptual design phase merely explained the various tasks. At the preliminary
l
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design stage, functional block diagrams delineating each task, order of
performance relative to others tasks, and the amount of time required, is
necessary. An example of the level of functional breakdown intended is
provided in Figure 5-1 for the Hydraulic Borehole Mining concept discussed
earlier (see Section IV-B). This information now provides an estimate of the
amount of time exposed to the hazards which were identified tb rough the hazard
analysis. Similarly, the intended manning levels for each task must also be
provided. This information is necessary for determining the location and size
of the risk population. Two final elements that dust be provided are the
operational and design characteristics of equipment. Those can he .defined
through operating specifications and blueprints (i.e., oper4 ting speeds, line
pressures, power requirements and basic design of the mining equipment, as
well as special support equipment which may be used in positioning the miner,
etc.). Understanding these elements of the machinery is eosential for
evaluating protective features of a new system.
Other data which are useful but not required at the preliminary design
stage relate to specific site conditions. As indicated earlier in Sectioas II
and V-B, certain hazards are aggravated by working in low seam heights, and by
extremely wet floor or poor geology conditions. These elements could be
considered as representative site conditions and would therefore be important
to the group of experts in the final adjustment process,
Task time and manpower data for conventional equipment complete the
needed information for the exposure time analysis. Sources for these data are
industrial engineering studies done on several types of equipment. These
studies were conducted by 	 (Conventional Mining and Longwall Conveyor
System Study)(18,)9), J. J. Davis (Continuous Miner St,udy)(20), and Theodore
Barry (Augering and Surface Mining Study)(21 1 7). The results of these studies
are summarized in the Appendix to assist the evaluator in performing the expo-
sure i0 ex calculations. Some surface equipment is included in the summary in
the event a new design is intended to operate from the surface, thereby re-
placing an underground technique (such as the hydraulic borehole), or uses
similar equipment (such as a small road scraper which removes heaves and rolls
in the main entries). The Appendix is not comprehensive but serves as a
reasonable foundation which the evaluator may supplement as needed.
b.	 Sources and Organization of InjuTy Data. The primary source
of historical injury '-ita is MSHA. MSHA provides several different types of
injury reporting formats which vary in detail. For example, the yearly summary
of fatalities, disabling and non-disabling injuries is provided in the MSHA
Information Report entitled "Injury. Experience in Coal Mining" (15) This
report aggregates injuries for the industry by state, by accident, and class,
and then as a function of body component. This 'report is adequate for the pro-
tection evaluation but does not provide the necessary detail for the exposure
time analysis. The summary which does provide the appropriate breakdown of
injuries by accident class and task is report number CM341L2 entitled "Coal
Employment and Injury Summary by Month" (22). '','his particular format is useful
because it defines each activity clearly enough to link the associated injuries
with the detailed tasks and hazards previously provided in Section II of this
methodology. Each accident class is coded as Jihown in Table 5-7. Since the
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I
Table 5-7. Acciftnt Class Codes and Descriptions
Accident
Class	 Description
01	 Electrical. (current producing)
02	 Entrapment
03	 Exploding vessels under pressure (air hoses, air tanks, hydraulic
lines, hydraulic hose burst, etc.)
04	 Explosives and breaking agents (e.g., Airdox, Cardox)
OS	 Falling, rolling or sliding rock or material of any kind
06	 Fall of face, rib, side or highwall
07	 Fall of roof (Underground mines onl )
08	 hire
09	 Handling material (lifting, pulling, pushing, shoveling)
10	 Hand tools (not electric and air-powered tools)
11	 Nonpowered haulage: wheelbarrows, manually pushed mine cars and
trucks. Motion of haulage causes accident
12	 Powered haulage (include motors and rail cars, conveyors shuttle
cars, haulage trucks, front-end loaders, load haul dumps, CAVO,
{	 forklifts, etc.). Motion of haulage causes accident
13	 Hoisting (cages, skips, ore buckets, elevators, etc.). Motion of
haulage causes accident
14	 Ignition or explosion of gas or dust
15	 Impoundment unstable condition (include refuse pile, or culm bank)
lb	 Inundation (inrush of water or mud or both)
17	 Machinery (include electric and air-powered tools; mining machines;
draglines, shovels, gathering arm loaders, stationary"mucking
machines, slushers, etc.). Motion of machinery causes accident
18	 Slip or fall of person (include stepping in hole)
19	 Stepping/kneeling on object where object is cause of accident
20	 Striking or bumping while not handling material, while not on
machinery or haulage, or not using handtool. Code only where no
other applies
21	 Other (not occupational illness)
a
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activities are already delineated in the report data base, the evaluator simply
requests the report number (C?1341L2) and the desired accident class codes from
MSHA. Other pertinent MSHA )injury summaries are the ao-called "Yellow Jacket's
reports. These are specific studies which examine injuries in a given accident
class as a function of hazards and activities, equipment involved, and other
variables such as worker age and years of experience (12 9
 
23, 24, 25).
The OSHA injury data base may be used if it is more appropriate to
compare a new design against equipment used in metal and non-metal mining, or
the natural gasp petrol:ump and construction industries. OSHA publishes a
yearly summary of injuries by industry. However, this summary is confined to
total deaths and disabling and non-disabling injuries because of the large
number of reporting industries. Detailed reports of injuries by accident class
must be obtained by formal request. Additionallyp each request must delineate
the coded accident class desired. This is done by selecting the appropriate
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes which refer to both the industry
and equipmentp and then choosing the desired accident class from the Supple-
mental Data System (SDS) codes. The SDS takes the total injuriest associated
with a given industry and type of equipment and separates them by the major
sources of the accident. For example, the latest 1978 SDS tabulation of
pressure release injuries associated with petroleum and natural, gas extraction
is on the order of 600 (i.e.p 400 injuries associated with being struck by the
medium of oil or gas, and another 200 injuries caused by being struck by
pressure lines) (26). If the evaluator desires amore detailed breakdown of
SDS injuries by activity at the time of injuryp then a representative state
can be selected to establish the general percentage contributions of each
activity to the total injuries. In the case of the petroleum and natural gas
industries, Texas might be selected as a significant source for this informa-
tion. Table 5-8 summarizes the industry and equipment SIC codes which would
most likely be used in the methodology.
Once obtained, the historical injury data must be organized according to
mining method (i.e., longwall, continuous mining, or conventional cut and
shoot). Activities in some accident classes (such as roof fallsp and machin-
ery) stipulate the equipment typep or application. However, activities in
other accident classes (such as handling material, electrical, and handtools)
do not indicate the mining method employed at the time of injury. This problem
can be resolved by obtaining a breakdown of injuries related to each generic
mining technique by accident class via a special MSHA report, or by propor-
tioning the injuries in the accident classes not broken down by equipment by
the fraction each method contributes to the overall injuries. The propor-
tioning method may be more practical if the MSHA breakdown is unavailablep or
if minor errors in apportioning injuries by mining technique do not greatly
effect the injury rate. The following discussion demonstrates the insensi-
tivity of the injury rates to minor errors in injury tabulation.
Table 5-9 indicates the magnitude and percentage each underground method
contributes to the average total yearly injuries.
Table 5-8. Standard industrial Classification (SIC)
Codes for Selected Industries and Equipment
SIC Code Industry/Equipment
10 Metal mining
14 Non-Metal Mining
131 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction
162 Heavy Construction
3531 Construction Machinery
3533 Oil Field Machinery
3535 Conveyors
3536 Hoists, Cranes
3537 Industrial Trucks and Tractors
3561 Pumps and Compressors
3560 Power Transmission 'Equipment
Table 5-9. Contribution of Each Major Underground
Dining Method to Total Yearly Injuries
Mining Method	 Average Contribution to the Percent Contribution to the
Total Yearly Injuries	 Total Yearly Injuries
Conventional	 5V000	 27
Continuous	 11,000	 60
Longwall	 2,000	 13
Total	 180000	 100
Reference:
MSHA Tabular Report ABO-601A for 1979
ri
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The yearly accrued worker hours for each of the above respective mining
methods are on the order of 60, 200, and 20 million man hours. Considering
the magnitudes of the total yearly injuries and man hours, one could mistakenly
apportion as many as 50 injuries to the wrong mining method in all of the nine
major accident classes and only generate a maximum error of about M in the
overall injury rate. This would not effect the injury projection and eubse-
quent acceptance of a now design (i.e. $
 a promising new design that was within
15% of the overall injury requirement would be examined for possible improve-
ments Ont would allow it to meet tho requirement in the prototype phase).
Furthermore, some of these errors can be rectified during the interview process
with the experts. For example, if the analysis placed a disproportionate
number of conveyor injuries with conventional mining, then the experts might
correct the baseline during the interview. The projection for the new design
would then be adjusted accordingly.
c.	 Organization of Task Time Data for the New and Conventional
Comparison Systems. In many instances a new concept may identify various task
activities such that they are compatible with conventional tasks. However, it
is very likely that a new design may define worker tasks differently from con-
ventonal, equipment. This could occur because of architectural or operational
differences. To determine exposure time indices for this situation, the
evaluator should define the tasks for both the new and conventional comparison
systems using a generic classification such as ground control, machinery
 main-
tenance, machinery operation, etc. The exposure times for all the various
activities would then be aggregated under one task classification and an
overall exposure index would be calculated. For example, the comparison of a
tunnel, borer with room and pillar mining equipment (see Section IV-B), would
require the assessment of very different roof support activities. The tunnel
borer might shotcrete in one single procedure as opposed to the normal tempo-
rary support, roof testing, and roof bolting activities practiced in room and
pillar. Nevertheless, all of these tasks could be grouped under the classifi-
cation of ground control and compared as an aggregate when projecting injuries
due to goof falls.
4.	 Illustrative Example
The auger-hydraulic borehole example discussed in Section IV-B
identified the following hazards experienced by these systems in the haulage
accident class:
(1) Surface Auger
(a) Workers can be struck by the conveyor chain drive
which can fail under load.
(b) Workers can be struck by conveyor fragments resulting
from belt failure under load, or can become entrapped
in the moving conveyor.
(c) Workers can be struck by debris falling off the
conveyor.
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(d) Workers can suffer injuries in the process of moving
large debris which has fallen off the conveyor.
(2) Hydraulic borehole Miner
Workers can be struck by high pressure fluid: or
pressure line fragments in the event the input or
output lines fail.
In summary, the hydraulic borehole system appeared safer because it:
(1) reduced the number of workers perfo;,^ ming support tasks around the hat!lage
equipment; (2) removed the need for a conveyor, thereby streamlining the
haulage operation.; and (3) provided a barrier (i.e., cab) to protect the
operator against falling drill or cuttev pipe segments, and pressure line
failures. Hazard reduction design features 1 and 2, above, relate to exposure
time reductions, and the cab feature relates to protection. The pertinent data
required for^this safety comparison are shown in Table 5:10.
The exposure time calculation uses the data which refers to the compa-
rable haulage tasks for the auger and borehole systems. The hydraulic borehole
resembles the oil and natural gas industry in terms of the hazards associated
with pressure release. Therefore, the protection the cab affords will be
evaluated by its ability to reduce the characteristic injuries caused by these
hazards in the oil and natural gas industry.
The exposure time calculation is performed using the expression
developed in Section V-C.
t.i
n	 Ni T. f i gii
Entering the data from Table 5 -10 in the Above expression immediately shows
that both the overall and serious injury rates are 0 because the exposure
index is 0.
"
	
	
The evaluation of the hydraulic borehole cab design requires a determina-
tion of the degree of operator protection. In order to feel confident that
the cab serves its purpose, it twist be verified that the cab provides a com-
plete protective envelope for the worker (i.e., he will not be required to
leave the protection). The task requires that the operator control and monitor
the mining and slurrying process from the cab. This implies that any fluctua-
tionA in pressures prior to line rupture or major blockage can be observed
prior to catastrophic failure. Additionally, the elimination of the extra
worker normally required on oil and natural gas extraction.rigs reduces
exposure further (see Table 5-10). Table 5-10 also indicates that the cab is
de signed in accordance with OSHA falling object and rollover protection
r
	
	
standards. This information, coupled with use of reinforced, shatterproof
glass, implies that the cab could withstand reasonably high impact forces
(i.e., the 4500 psi inlet pressure). The actual extent of the protection_
provided the operator would be determined by the group of experts; but the
i
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preliminary conclusion could be made that the cab design is sound and that
there is a high probability of mitigating the pressure release hazard (and the
normal yearly injuries associated with this hazard):
The above discussion provides a very basic illustration of the exposure
time analysis and a comprehensive example of the protection analysis. A more
representative example of a typical exposure time calculation would apply to
the handling material accident class. Protection is not considered in this
example. The pertinent task time and injury data for this are shown in
Table 5-11.
The primary handling material hazards associated with these systems are:
(1) workers being struck by machine components when hoisting or replacing them,
and (2) workers being pinched while securing auger or borehole pipe segments
together. Examination of Table 5-11 indicates that hydraulic borehole tasks
are more complex, and could therefore aggravate these hazards. The possibility
of reducing exposure by cutting crew size is eliminated since the number of
workers are: the same. Further examination of the tasks in Table 5-11 reveals
that the general operating and repair procedures are the same. Therefore, the
tasks can be compared generically under the following headings:
Task 1 - Handling material activities during coal extraction.
Task 2 - Handling material activities While repairing equipment.
The injury calculation for the first task is done using the same expression as
before:
t.i
ni	 N Ti i gi
The subscript (i.) is now (1) and the respective parameters for the extraction
task are defined as:
N1 - 7 injuri,eshir
tl = 40 hrs
TI
 = 3.6 hrs
fl _ I
g i = the final, gdjustment factor provided by the group of experts.
The initial projection (less the input from the experts) is then,
ni = 7 (306) (1) = 78 injuries/yr
The serious injuries are projected using the expression (see Section V-0:
S i
 = niRi
where
nl = 78 injuries/yr
R1 0.75 (the ratio of serious to total injuries for these activities)
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Table 5-11. Detailed Data Elements for the Auger and Hydraulic
Borehole Handling Material Activities
Task Description	 Time Task, h	 Approximate Number
of Yearly Injuries
Auger (one place change)
Auger sections added during extraction 	 2.5	 Fatalities - 0
process	 Disabling - 3
Auger sections removed after extraction	 1.1	 Non-disabling - 4
- Bits inspected and replaced (in place) 	 1.0	 Fatalities - 0
- Repair and replacement of hoist 	 0.25	 Disabling - 1
components or tread pads (in place)	 Non-disabling - 1
- Unscheduled repair of machine	 1.0
components (in place)
Number of workers involved (3)
Hydraulic Borehole (one place change,)
- hoist drill segments in place, drill	 18
borehole and install casing segments
- Assemble mining device (hoist borehole	 12	 TBD*
miner pipe sections in place, secure
sections and lower into borehole)
- Dismantle mining sections after 	 10
extraction completed
inspect drilling and mining devices 	 2.0	 TBD*
and make repairs (in place)
- Number of workers involved (3)
TBD - To be determined.
References:
Auger Handling Material Task Times, Extracted from the Appendix.
Floyd, E., "Borehole Hydraulic Coal Mining Systems Analysis," JPL
publ. 77 -19, April 1977.
MSHA Injury Summary, Informational Report No. IR1112 0 1979.
Discussions With MSHA Health and Safety Analysis Center (Separation of
Auger Injuries by Task Activity), February 26 9 1981.
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The initial estimate for serious injuries is then,
Si s
 78 (0.75) - 59 injuries/yr
Similarly, the maintenance task would be the second handling materials task,
and the projected total and serious injuries are 2 and 1/yr, respectively. The
sum of the projected handling materials injuries for both tasks is then 80/yr.
The total serious injuries are projected to be 60/yr. The projected increase
in injuries is based on the large amount of time requirsA to handle heavy,
cumbersome drill, casing and borehole miner components. This could indicate a
design weakness and point to an area where the process might be ztreamlined.
The evaluator would then proceed to sake injury projections for the
activities and hazards related to the remaining accident classes and hazards
in the same manner. The final step would be to present these projections to a
group of experts to determine if they represent reasonable projections based
on the group's experience. This process is discussed in the next section,
followed by an example using the same two systems.
5.	 Projection Adjustments Based on the Consensus of Safety Experts
In Section V-C, some crucial assumptions were made about the rela-
tionship between exposure and injuries and design effectiveness; namely, that:
(1) Injury occurrence is directly proportional to exposure.
(2) Safety-related design changes will be completely effective
in mitigating hazards.
Historical injury data suggest that these assumptions are not always
well-founded (12). However, the projection process would be very complicated
if an attempt were made to cob sider these realities during the analysis. For
this reason, the final evaluation and adjustment of the injury projections is
reserved for a group of experts in the field of mine safety. A representative
group would include members from the Unit?-,d Nine Workers (UMW), MSHA, OSHA,
Department of Energy, and perhaps industry,
The projection adjustment is basically an iterative questioning process
which first introduces the new design concept to the panel of experts, and
then, using both the present and projected injury levels, asks the group to
refine this range of injuries by applying its experience.
The introduction of the new concept must be thorough because the review
group may not be familiar with the new technology. This introductory step
should include the following information:
(1) Graphic di?plays of the new design architecture and functional
block diagrams of the complete system.
(2) Complete descriptions of system operations, including_ major control
variables (i.e., component reliability, cutting speeds, line pres-
sures, power requirements), and system limitations (i.e., maximum
roof load system can support, etc.).
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(3) Explanation of the selection criteria for the conventional compari-
son and review of the system failures and hazards for each system.
(4) Review of historical injury experience for the analogous conven-
tional system with an explanation of the new design features that
may affect the injury levels through exposure time, protection, or
labor reductions.
(5) Review of other factors which may affect safety such as the
possible need for more structured training and certifications or,
representative geological and environmental conditions (if known).
The final step in the adjustment process is to provide the group of
experts with the injury projections for the various activities and hazards as
compared against the historical injury levels. This is done so that the
experts have a baseline from which they can extrapolate their own projections
while weighing the new design features and variables such as nonlinearities
between exposure time and injuries, ways in which workers may not utilize pro-
tection afforded, or how the mine environment prevents equipment from operating
as designed. The interactive questioning process commences with the evaluator
asking the experts if they feel the realistic injury level is closer to the
projection or the historical injuries. The experts may agree with the projec-
tion or indicate an initial estimate elsewhere within the range. In any case,
the experts must provide reasons for their estimates. The evaluator then
chooses a smaller range around the initial estimate and again queries the group
for an estimate of where the injury level may be (i.e., is it closer to the new
lower or upper value). This process is continued until the experts reach a
point of agreement, at which time the final injury level is expressed as a
range. This procedure is done for all the activities and hazards in each
accident class. The injuries are summed over all the tasks and accident
classes and divided by the yearly man hours worked on the conventional compari-
son (because the new design would, theoretically replace the existing system) to
establish the injury rate. This rate is then compared against the requirement
to determine if the new design is acceptable.
A new design might fall short of the safety requirement but still show
merit in other areas such as production. In this case, the experts would
review those design areas that could improve on safety and recommend changes
that could be incorporated in the detailed design and prototype phase.
6.	 Illustrative Example
The auger-hydraulic borehole miner example was continued in the last
section with a quantitative projection of injuries for the haulage and handling
materials accident classes. The projection reflected a total removal of
injuries associated with normal conveyor haulage tasks ( since the borehole
miner slurrys the coal out of the seam); a high probability of mitigating
pressure release hazards using the cab; a substantial increase in materials
handling injuries associated with the borehole miner drill stem, casing, and
borehole segments; and the same number of 'handling material injuries related to
x	 r
5-30
	 r
^a^	 .. .aa.._. __ _^...._.. 	 - is.YLJ$^.t-,t2a_^^liaLS'ac^ t^L.:vc.'IIM •_.• 'Y'm..w+ili l'2C =•Y.n..^,'5.zrutv.....^ .., yc..........
	 _	 ..	 u
maintenance (since the tasks are similar and of the same duration). The next
step in to approach a group of experts and use the interactive questioning
technique outlined above to refine these projections in light of their experi-
ence. Two, industry experts with substantial experience in surface mining and
oil extraction technology were chosen to participate in this phase of the
methodology. Each expert was provided a description of the borehole-miner; a
comparison of the borehole miner, auger, and oil, natural gas extraction
hazards; and the historical and projected injury levels. Tables 5-12 and 5-13
summarize the results of the interviews.
The results of the interviews show that the experts agreed with the
exposure time calculations, but had some reservations about the ability of the
cab to completely protect the operator. These reservations were based on the
experts' experience with what one may call the "curiosity" of the operator to
confirm that a line rupture is actually occurring. Therefore, the final injury
projection for the protection aspect of the design would be as follows:
b. = E. d.J	 J
where,
Bj - 600 (the historical injuries per year caused by pressure release)
dj = 0.1 - 0.2 (the injury reduction factors provided by the experts)
Thus, the refined injury projection would be,
bj = 60 - 120 injuries per year
The two experts were asked for design suggestions that might help resolve
the handling material hazards. Both industry experts replied that the large
amount of pipe handling required for drilling and mining could be streamlined
by using a "merry-go-round" system. This technique, presently employed in the
oil drilling industry, is a semi-automated system which picks up a drill seg-
ment and inserts it vertically into a carousel which can hold several segments.
As each segment is placed in the hole, the carousel automatically rotates the
next segment in place. The whole system requires two operators; one for opera-
ting the machine that places drill pipe in the carousel, and one for operating
the carousel. The suggest:an was made that the borehole miner operator could
operate the carousel along with monitoring the mining process.
The final adjustment of the injury projections by the safety experts,
concludes the safety analysis. In summary, the evaluator has been provided a
systematic method of analyzing the safety of new designs. This procedure
started at the conceptual design level with a detailed hazard analysis, general
regulatory test, and identification of hazard reduction features. This was
followed by a quantitative projection of the injury levels for a new design,
considering the hazard reduction features. A structured approach for adjusting
^.
	
	 the projections (using a group of safety experts) was then outlined, con-
sidering weaknesses inherent in most modeling processes.
t
Table 5-12. Results of the Interactive Questioning
Procedure with Expert l
Accident Class and Description	 Injury
of Hazard Exposure Elements	 Aijustment	 Reason
Haulage
Removal of conveyor-related. 	 None Agree with projection; the
hazards using the coal streamlined process completely
slurrying process removes hazards
Cab protection against	 1/10 Protection cab affords and
pressure release removal of additional worker
usually required on oil rigs
will substantially reduce
injuries; however, workers
may still be
	
.nduced to leave
cab to inspect rig for
impending failure and be
exposed at that time
I
None	 Agree with projection -
the borehole requires an
excessive amount of large
component handling; the hoist
system is very cumbersome and
allows considerable ways for
workers to be struck or
pinched by swinging pipe
segments
Handling Material
Increase in exposure to
being struck or pinched by
hydraulic borehole drill,
casing, and miner pipe
segments
Inspection and maintenance 	 Agreement	 Two injuries per year is not
tasks	 unreasonable
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Table 5-13. Results of tho Interactive Questioning
Procedure with Expert 2
Accident Class and Description
	 Injury
of Hazard Exposure Elements
	 Adjustow nt	 Reason
Haulage
Removal of conveyor-related
tasks using the coal
slurrying process
Cab protection against
pressure release
Handling Material
None
	
Agree with projection; closed loop
process eliminates hazards
1/10	 Protection will not be complete
because worker may leave cab to
inspect rig for leaks; or, if the
pressure line bursts at 4500 psi,
fragments could hit workers
setting up another rig in the
vicinity
Increase in exposure to being None
struck or pinched by hydraulic
borehole drill, casing, and
miner pipe segments
Agree with projection - handling
large components like drill stems
and casing segments is extremely
hazardous
Inspection and maintenance 	 Agreement This is a reasonable injury level
tasks	 for tasks like this
This methodology was designed to represent a realistic approach to
measuring the safety performance of new detiigns by, (1) establishing practical
goals for overall safety performance, (2) miea$uring the safety of new designs
based on their own merits and not assuming the hazards will remain the same as
existing systems, (3) addressing a wide variety of ways hazards may be reduced,
(4) giving direction to the designer through identification of major hazards,
key risk populations, and design guidelines $
 (5) providing a means of locating
weak design areas, and (6) incorporating actual safety experience through the
group of experts to adjust the results so they represent realistic measures of
performance.
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